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INTRODUCTION
This article explores the work of statutory human rights
and equality bodies in Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland, and offers an analysis of the factors that have an
impact on their operation. There are currently six statutory
bodies established in Ireland and the United Kingdom to
promote and enforce human rights or a key dimension of
human rights, equality: the Irish Human Rights Commission
("IHRC") and the Equality Authority of Ireland ("EA"); the
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission ("NIHRC") and
the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland ("ECNI"); the
Scottish Human Rights Commission ("SHRC") and the
Equality and Human Rights Commission ("EHRC",
covering England, Scotland and Wales). While the timing of
the establishment of these bodies reflected developments within
these islands, there is an international context to their
proliferation in the past two decades encouraged by the United
Nations ("UN"), Council of Europe and Commonwealth
Secretariat.
Domestically there was significant support within civil
society in Ireland and in the United Kingdom for the idea of
these "commissions," albeit some differences of view reflecting
political contexts: not least the background to the Belfast
(Good Friday) Agreement 1998 which preceded the
establishment of te Northern Ireland Commissions, and fallout
from the closure of precursor bodies. In each case the
organizations have undertaken activities and secured
outcomes that have been welcomed, but there have also been
concerns about their operation and the limits of what they have
been able to achieve. While the most recent Commission, tie
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SHRC, was established only in 2008, each has sufficient
experience to begin an assessment of the factors that have had
an impact on their achievements and the difficulties they have
faced. Each has a distinctive remit and role but share enough in
common for a useful discussion on lessons learnt so far and
potential future reforms to strengthen their contribution.
The discussion is timely in a global and regional context
given current developments. Prior to the 2010 election in
Ireland, the then government undertook a review of the
functions of the human rights and equality bodies and a
merger of these bodies is now in progress.' In Britain, the
government proposes to amend the EHRC's statute to adjust
its roles and accountability arrangements. 2 Its remit would be
narrowed, some functions removed, and it would be subject to
tighter reporting requirements in relation to its business plan
and financial affairs. I The Commission has, like its Irish
counterparts, recently been subject to a substantial cut in its
resources. Meanwhile in Northern Ireland, the Equality
1. Analysis in this article of the two institutions in Ireland must be viewed in the
context of imminent merger, and thus the lessons that can be learned froL the
experiences of both organizations. In order to advance this relorm, a Working Group
on de establishment of a new, enhanced Irish Human Rights and Equality Comnmission
was appointed on October 6, 2011, with the aim of having the new (ommission in
place by the end of February 2012. The Group comprised of a Chair, lour outgoing
members each of the IHRC and EAM, a representative of the Department of Justice and
Equality and the Special Adviser to the Minister. The terms of reference noted the
need for a "new, integrated and independent Human Rights and Equality
(ommission." A consultation was launched in November 2011 to encourage public
input into the process. The Merger 'Working Group reported in April 2012: Working
Group on the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, Repor to the Miristerfir
Justice, Equality and Defence (Apr. 19, 2012), and see: Heads of the Irish Humnan Right
and Equality Comuission Bill 2012 (29' May 2012). See also Angela Kcrins, Equaity
Strategy eeds to Address Fragmentation and Duplication, IR. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011,; .ee aso
Carol Coulter, Aerger of Rights Authorities Urged, IR. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011,
http://wN.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0423/ 1224295311869_pthtnl;
Carol Coulter, Coalition to AMerge Human Rights Commission a,nd Eqaality Authority, IR.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011, http:/iwww.irishtimes.cominewspaper/irelandi2011,0909i
1224303758897.htnil. At the time of writing (March 2012) the Working Group has yet
to report.
2. See HIf Government, Building a fairer Britain Refortm of the Equality and Hunan
Rights Commission. ResPonse to the Consultation' (HAI Goverment, 15 Alay, 2012); GOV'T
EQUALS. OnF., PUB. No. JN 404645, BUILDING A FAIRER BRITAIN: REFORM OF THE
EoUALITY AND HUTMAN RIGHTS (OMMISSION 8 (2011).
3. See Alajor Reforms to Equality and Human Rights Commission, HOME OFF., (Mar.
21, 2011), http:/iwww.homeoflice.gov.uk/centre//relorm.
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Commission is now co-located and shares some office services
with the new Northern Ireland Commissioner for Older
People, 4 the Commission for Children and Young People, 5 and
the Commission for Victims and Survivors, heralded as a cost-
saving measure while retaining separate statutory remits. 7 Like
the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the ECNI
entered a new phase with the appointment of a new Chief
Commissioner in 2012.8 A process for the appointment of a
new Chair for the Equality and Human Rights Commission
should also be completed in the autumn of 2012. It is well
recognized that globally National Human Rights Institutions
(NHRIs) have faced globally significant challenges. 9 A survey of
sixty-one such bodies in 2009 found many reporting concerns
relating to the appointment procedures for their board,
government influence on budgets, shortage of resources,
and weakness in management structures, as well as issues
relating to their relationships with stakeholders and lack of
responsiveness of governments to their recommendations. 10 A
recent report from the EU Fundamental Rights Agency
expressed concern that European NHRI's lacked sufficient
political support, were insufficiently independent and often
4. The first commissioner is Claire Kcatinge, appointed rom November 14, 2011.
5. See generlly N. IR. COIM'R FOR CHIL D. & YOUNG PEOPI E,
http://wvwv.niccy.org/ (last visited Apr. 14 2012).
6. See generaly COMM'N FOR VICTIMS &. SURVIXVORS, http://wwi.cvsni.org/ (last
visited kpr. 14. 2012).
7. Announced by Minister Jonathan Bell in June 2011: Junior Ministers Announce
Cost Savings for Commissioners, EQUAL. COMMN TOR N. IR. (june 24, 2011),
http://ww .equalityni.org//.asp-cms=NewsNewvs&cmsid= l2&id=285&secid 1 1.
8. The new Chief Commissioner is Michael VWardlow and his appointment was
announced on Februar) 22, 2012, (starting March first for a three-year period) by the
Secretarv of State for Northern Ireland, Owven Paterson: Paterson Announces Appointnent
to the Equality Connmission for Northern Ireland, N. IR. OFF. (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://ww nio.gov.uk/patersion-annountces-appoinmient to-the-equality-comnission-
forinorther n-ireland/media-detail.htmr? newsl 1) 18252.
9. See generally INT'L COUNCII ON HUM. RTS. POLICY, PERFORMANCE AND
LEGITINLACY: NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2004); A MNLSTY INTL, PUB. No.
40/007/2001, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON NATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2001).
10. See generall OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMR TOR Hum. RTS., UNITED NATIoNS,
SURTY" ON NATIONAI HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS AND
RLCOMMENDATIONS OF A QESTIONNAIRL ADDRLSSED To NHRIs WORLDWIDE (2009),
available at htItp:/ /Wwl.nlri.n/2009/')Questionnairc%20-%20C(oiplcc%20Repor
%20FINAI-edited.pd
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effective, and that bodies within one country had overlapping
mandates but also gaps that made it more difficult for those
seeking redress to know where to turn." An analysis of the
factors that have shaped the performance of the statutory
human rights and equality bodies in Ireland and the UK thus
has a global relevance, despite the differing contexts in which
they work.
In this Ar ticle we look first at that global context and briefly
at the issues that have been raised in academic and policy debates
relevant to our discussion. 12 The authors then outline-in broad
terms-the history, mandates, powers, duties, accountability, and
governance arrangements and resources of the six bodies before
considering whether and how these factors impact on their
operation. In that analysis we draw on the views of the seminar
participants and interviewees whom the authors have consulted
during this research, and on our own experience working within
and alongside some of the commissions and their precursor
bodies. I", The authors do not attempt to evaluate the
performance of the commissions, only to tease out the factors
that appear to have an impact on it, in the context of an
evolvng global debate about the role of NHRIs.
11. See ELR. UNioN AGLNCY FOR FLINDAMLINT.A-L RTs.. NATION.AL HUNLAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS IN THE EU MEMBER STATES: STRENGTHENING THE FIUNT)AMENTAI RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE IN THE LU I I 3, I8 (2010), (vailable (t http:i/fr-a.europa.euisitesi
detault/files/frauploads/816-NHRI-en.pdf
12. For an examination of the spread of NHRIs see generally Thomas Pegram,
Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions. 32
HUM. RTs Q. 729 (2010); Anne Smith, The Lnique Position of National Huoian Rights
Ir stitatiors: A Md Blessirg, 28 HUm. RTS. Q. 904 (2006).
13. Both authors have extensive practical experience of working in and with
commissions in the United Kingdom and Ireland. All interviews were conducted by the
authors of this piece. Interviewees were informed of the interv iew's purpose, its
voluntary nature, and the ways the information provided would be used. All consented
verbally to be interviewed and were told they could decline to answer any question and
end the interview at any time. The names of those consulted are listed on page 1. Due
to the sensitive nature of the issues examined, however. those direct quotes rom them
that arc used are refe renced only by the daLc of intclview, correspondence widl the
authors, or seminar participation.
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1. THE RISE OF A TIOANAL M11ECHAN1SMIS FOR RIGHTS
AND EQUALITY
With the exception of France, the first statutory bodies for
the protection of human rights were established in the 1970s,
but the rapid expansion in their number has been seen only
in the last two decades. The additional support for the NHRIs
in the last twenty years reflected recognition of the
international human rights machinery and the need for a
mechanism that could react more quickly and directly to
developments at the national level.
Concerned that the authority of such bodies could be
undermined if some were seen to lack independence from
government or the powers to be effective, the UN General
Assembly endorsed a base-line standard covering the competence,
responsibilities, composition, and independence of
national human rights institutions: the Paris Principles, in
1993.4 The Principles allow states some latitude in deciding
what kind of institution is appropriate, but carry authority in
requiring that a broad mandate and sphere of competence
should be set down in the country's Constitution or statute; and
that the responsibiliies of the institution should include the
right, acting on its own initiative or by request to "[flireely
consider any questions falling within its competence," to
submit proposals, reports and recommendations to Parliament,
government, and other competent authorities on any human
rights issue, and to make public its views through the press
including "expressing an opinion on the positions and reactions
of the Government." '' 5 It should be able to examine existing and
proposed legislation for conformity to international human
rights principles, to contribute to reports that states submit to
the UN supervisory bodies; to recommend new legislation and to
have the power to hear any person and obtain any information
or documentation necessary for assessing situations within its
competence. '5
The Paris Principles state that national human rights
institutions may also be authorized to hear and resolve complaints
14. Paris Principles, G.A. Res. 48/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20 1993).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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and should be able to carry out research and contribute to
teaching and to promoting awareness of human rights,
including discrimination.1 7 They should be composed of people
broadly representative of civil society (in which unions, lawyers,
professionals, academics, and NGOs are specifically mentioned),
and have their own staff and premises in order to be independent
of government.18 Nor should they be subject to financial controls
that might affect that independence. 1 1 There is much,
nevertheless, that is not specified in the Principles, including key
matters such as enforcement powers, the precise nature
of the commission's independence from government, or
need for transparency in their operation. Hence it is argued
that:
While the Paris Principles laid out the foundational
objectives and operational functions of NHRIs, the
Principles fail to provide a legal basis for the
autonomous existence of the NHRIs, the standards
for achievement, and the measures to ensure the
effectiveness of the recommendations made by the
NHRIs .... Thus the Paris Principles are, at best, a
good starting point for discussions relating to the
formation of NHRIs, but it is not in the human rights
movement's best interest to give them more importance
than they deserve in light of their weaknesses and limited
nature.20
The UN Human Rights Centre published guidance giving
some flesh to the Principles2' and provides support to states
establishing such bodies. An International Coordinating
Committee ("ICC") of NHRIs verifies whether (and at what
level) a body qualifies for National Human Rights Institution
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. C. Raj Kumar, National Hurna Rights Institutions: Good Governarce Per:pectives
on Institutionalization of Human Rights. 19 AM. U. INTL L. RLV. 259, 274-75 (2003).
21. See generall,. U.N. CTR. FOR UILlM. RTs., NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTT UTIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AN) STRENGTHENING OF
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OT' HUMAN RIGHTS,
U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/4, U.N. Sales No. E.95.XIV.2 (1995), available at
http:i iwww.asiapacilicforum.neti /standards/ ipractice-for-nhrisi a handbook.pdf.
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status. 22 As of December 2011 there were sixty-nine fully
accredited NHRls, a further twenty deemed to comply in part
with the Paris Principles, and ten institutions defined as not in
compliance. 3 All four relevant institutions in the UK and Ireland
(EHRC, NIHRC, SHRC, and IHRC) currently enjoy 'A' status (a
formal position that has been contrasted with a substantive
reading of the Principles)y24 The status of the EHRC was subject
to a special review in 2010 and the NIHRC subject to its periodic
review in May 2011, and in both instances the institutions were
re-accredited with 'A' status25 The Sub-Committee of the ICC
responsible for accreditation produces General Observations on
interpretation of the Paris Principles, the process for which is
under review. The UN currently provides technical assistance to
NHRIs in more than sixty countries and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights together with the UN
Development Programme has recently produced a
comprehensive toolkit on NHRIs to facilitate collaboration. 26
The Council of Europe has similarly encouraged member
states to establish NHRIs since the mid-1990s and has helped to
coordinate their activities, 27 as has the Commonwealth
22. A Brief History of the ICC, Int'l Coordinating Comm. Of Nat'l Inst. for the
Promotion and Prot. of Hunan Rights, http:/nhri.ohchir.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/
History.aspx (last visited Sept. 24 2012).
23. Accreditation, since 1998, has accorded 'A' status to those that comply wvith
the Paris Principles, B status to those that comply in part, and C status to those that do
not. See Chart of the Status of National Institutions. INT'L (OORDINATING (',OMNI. OF NATL
INSTS. FOR THE PROMOTION & PROT. OF HUM. RTS. (Dec. 2011), (vailable at
http: //www.ohchr. org/ Documen ts/ C ountries /NHRI/ C ha rLStatus_NIs.pd.
24. See, e.g., IR. COLNCIL FOR CIVIL LIBLRTIES, SUBNISSION BY THL IRISH (OLNCIL
FOR CiVII, IIBERTIES (ICCL) TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMMISSION 2 (2011).
25. Chart of the Status of National Institutions, supra note 23 at 5.
26. See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME &- OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM.
RTS., UNL)I)-OHCHR TooiKIT FOR COLLABORATION WITH NATIONAL Hu-IAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS (2010), http://www.ohchr.org/DocnteLs/(Oulltries/NHRI/1950-
U NI)P-U H CH R-Toolkit- R.pdl
27. See Council of Europe, (omnl. of Ministers. Recommendation No. R (97) 14
of the (oInl. of Ministers to Member States on the Establishment of independent
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, (Sep. 30,
1997); Council of Europe, Comnli. of Ministers. Resolution (97) 11 of the Conlin. of
Ministers to Member States on tire Co-Operation Between Member States' National
Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights, and Between Them and the Council
of Europe, (Sep. 30, 1997). During the UK Chair of the Council of Europe this was
raised expressly in rfle context of addressing ire backlog of [ire European Court of
Human Rights. See Council of Europe Comm. of Ministers, Brighton Declaration, High
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Secretariat. There is recent guidance from the Council of
Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights on national structures
for promoting equality,28 and from its Commission against
Racism and Intolerance on the establishment of bodies
addressing racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism: 9 There are
requirements in European Union anti-discrimination law in
relation to statutory equality bodies."," Equinet, the network of
European equality bodies established in 2007 develops
cooperation and facilitates information exchange among its
thirty-seven member organizations from thirty countries,
including those that also have a human rights remit.3 1 There
are now, therefore, institutions and networks in many parts of
the world, taking varying forms from Commissions with a
broad mandate to "Ombuds" that have a focus on fairness
and legality in public service and specialized bodies focusing
on the rights of a particular vulnerable group, including those
established on race as a result of the EU Race Directive in 2000.32
Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights,,. (19-20
April, 2012),available at http://hub.coe.int/20120419-brighton-dcclaration; Richard
Carver, One NhRI or Man-? Hoay mav Institutions Does It Take to Protect Human Ri hts-
Lessons fiomr the Eurpean Epeer e, 3 j. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1, 5 (2011). For the
interaction between international law and NHRIs, see Richard Carver. A New Answer to
an Old Question: National Hluman Rights Institutions and the Domestication of 1nter ational
Law, 10 Hu-N. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
28. See Conn 'r for Hunan Rights, Council of Eur., Opinion of the Comnmissiohe rfor
Human Rights on National Structures for Promoting Equalit, Doc. No. (ominDH (2011)2
(2011).
29. See Eur. Connn'n Against Racisn & Intolerance, ECRI General Policy
Recommendation No. 2 on Specialised Bodies to Combat Racism. Xenophobia,
Antisemitism and Intolerance at National Level, Doc. No. CRI(97)36 (1997); see also
Eur. Coniu'n Against Racism & Intolerance, ECRI General Policy Reconmendation
No.7 on National Legislation to Coinbat Racisn and Racial Discrimination 24. Doc.
No. CRI (2003) 8 (2002).
30. The framework of law and guidance on equality bodies in Europe is set out in
Gay Moon. Enforcement Bodies, in (ASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL.
SUPRANATIONAL AN) INTERNATIONAL NON-DISCRIMINATION IAW (I)agmar Scheik et al.
eds., 2007).
31. See generall EQUINLT EUROPEAN NETWORK OF EoU ATY BODIES.
http:/iwwv.equineteurope.orgi (last visited Apr. 15,202).
32. See U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR Hum. RTs., Fact Sheet No. 19, National
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (1993), available at
http:iiwww.ohchr.org I)ocuments/iublicationsiFactSheetl 9en.pdl. The notable
exception is the United States. See CATHERINE POWELL, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCY FOR
LAW & POLICY, HUMAN RiGHTS AT HOME: A DOMESTIC POLIcy BLULPRINT FOR THE NEW
AHM1NISTRATION 19-23 (2009).
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11. AAALYZING LNSTITUTIONS
Academic and policy analysis of the operation of NHRIs
globally and of equality commissions (in Europe in particular)
has highlighted relevant issues including the tension between
independence and accountability, matters of remit and
composition, and the impact of external factors. In relation to
independence and accountability, scholars have seen NHRIs
as occupying a distinct space, separate from government and
from civil society, while having to establish working relationships
and levels of accountability to both. There have to be
mechanisms to appoint those in charge, call them to account
for their actions and for their use of public money, mechanisms
that nevertheless do not interfere with their operational
independence. Likewise, the credibility of the institution depends
on its responsiveness to civil society and on its visible
independence from it. It has been argued that it is only by teasing
out the differing levels of independence (legal and operational;
financial; responsibility for appointments and dismissals; and
composition and plurality) and likewise separating the layers of
accountability (to parliament or government as the appointing
body; to the public and to civil society; and accountability, in
turn, of the appointing body) that one can understand the
difficulties that many NHRIs experience and can hope to resolve
them.3-
A report for the Commonwealth Secretariat identified
some common factors found to have threatened the
independence of NHRIs within the Commonwealth including:
funding arrangements or budgetary procedures
determined by government; the method of appointment or
termination of Commissioners' period of office; and the
relationship with government departments on operational
matters. 4 While arguing that it is not possible to separate
completely NHRIs from the Executive, strong procedural
safeguards were deemed critical: "A perceived or actual lack
of independence will undermine the work, authority and
33. See Smith, supra note 12, at 908, 937-44.
34. (ATHERINE MEREDITH, COMMONWEALTH SLCRLTARIAT, (OMPAATIVE STUDY
ON MANDATES oT4 NATIO.N)AL HUMAN RIHTS INSTITUTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 35
(2007).
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legitimacy of these organizations."35 Where precisely the line
between independence and appropriate accountability should
fall, however, and how to assess its operation in practice, is not
straightforward: "Independence itself is a relative matter."36
The plurality of the board of NHRIs has been a further
focus of analysis given some lack of clarity in the Paris
Principles on the extent to which the board should itself reflect
civil society or have the capacity to engage with it. The literature
also suggests that there may be a trade-off between a large,
representative body on the one hand and its operational
independence and the cost of maintaining the board and
efficiency in decision making. There can be merit in exploring
differing models-plurality achieved in a non-executive Council (as
in Denmark) for instance coupled with a smaller executive
with operational responsibilitV.37 A further point of analysis is
the respective roles of government and legislatures, UN guidance
advocating appointments by and accountability to parliament
rather than to a government minister.
Research has also highlighted the paradox that most
NHRIs are too weak to provide much protection from human
rights violations while at the same time creating unprecedented
demand for that protection. This divergence is explained (from
examples in the Asia Pacific region) by government
motivation in establishing such bodies being to meet
international expectations rather than a perceived need to
address domestic human rights issues. 38 The limits on the
mandates of NHRIs are one focus of analysis, including the
regular omission of economic, social, and cultural rights;39 as
is the relationship with civil society. While civil society is
potentially of considerable value in providing information,
profile, and experience, and in calling the institution to
account, NHRIs and civil society nevertheless have distinct
35. Id. at 35, 84.
36. Moon, supra note 30
37. For Denmark see DANISH INST. FOR HUM. RTS., www.humnanrights.dk (last
visitcd Apr. 15, 2012).
38. Sonia Cardenas, Adaptive States. The Proliferation of National Human Rights
In stitutions 55 (Carr Otr. or Human Rights, Working Paper T-0 1-04, 2004).
39. See C. Raj Kumar. National Human Rights Institutions and Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Toward the Instit utionalization and Developmenaliza(on oj Human Rights,
28 Hum. RTS. Q 755, 757 (2006).
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roles and may legitimately differ in their perspectives on the
course of action to take.40
Finally, research has highlighted the importance of the
local political context to the operation of human rights
institutions, one study of five NHRIs (including the NIHRC)
suggests that an institution with a limited mandate may
have a demonstrable effect on human rights issues while a
lavishly resourced body can be dismissed as irrelevant:
"Ultimately', domestic human rights bodies are only as good as
the local political and economic contexts permit them to be .
.,4I The external environment impinges in two ways: in the
demands placed on the NHRI, their compatibility with its core
functions, and hence the degree of domestic support it enjoys;
and in the nature and extent of stakeholder participation. Here
the degree of human rights literacy is a key factor in whether
voluntary organizations contribute to the institution's capacity
to deliver or create a roadblock in its path. 42
Recent analysis of equality commissions in Europe provides
useful insight.443 There is clearly significant diversity but several
themes surface in the literature. Almost all bodies complain
about a lack of resources, and it appears evident that the
problem of under-reporting of discrimination (particularly on
sexual orientation and religion) is endemic across Europe.44 In
addition to all the familiar political, legal, structural, and
institutional factors, independence recurs in these studies as a
key element of an effective equality body, and an Equinet study
on precisely this issue is of particular value.45 Authors Kutsal
Yesilkagit and Berend Snijders list managerial independence,
policy independence, structural independence, and legal
independence as the central elements and use these to frame
40. See Kumar, supra note 20 at 296-298.
41. Julic A. Mcrtus, Human Rights Matter: Local politics and National Human
Rights Institutions 2 (2009).
42. Id. at 138-39.
43. See generallY N M-GIT AMMLR LT A ., HUMAN EUR. (ONSULTANCY & LUDWIG
BOLTZMANN INSTITUT FOR MENSCHLNRLCHTL, STUDY ON EQUA~i BODIES SET UP
UNDER )IRECTYES 2000/43/EC, 2004/ 11 EC AND 2006/54/EC (20 10).
44. Id. at [[ 20. 170.
45. See generallY Kutsal Yesilkagi[ & Bcrcnd Snijdcrs, Equinct, Bctwecn Impartiality
and Responsiveness: Equality Bodies and Practices of Independence (2008).
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their assessment. 4 Their study reports reasonable levels of
financial independence, a fair level of independence on
personnel management, with virtually all having full policy
independence on assistance, hearing cases, and issuing reports. 47
Their focus on leadership in counter-framing NGO perceptions
of their role is instructive 48 and links to the suggestion that de
facto independence will often depend on strong leadership and
good internal management. 4 1 The work emerging on equality
bodies is providing genuine evidence-based insight into
comparative experience and examples of good practice on
which to base future work. This also now includes work on the
linkages between equality bodies and NHRIs, the principles that
should guide the approach, the types of interaction, as well as
factors for success and areas for further action.50
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY COMISSIONS IN
THE UAITED KINGDOM AND IRELAND
The aim in this section is to take each institution and
outline in broad terms its position in relation to five areas: the
establishment of the body; role and remit; duties and powers;
arrangements for independence and accountability; and finally
its internal governance, structure, budget and staffing. This is
provided as background to the more significant discussion on
the respective relevance (if any) of these factors on
performance.
A. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
The NIHRC was established by the Northern Ireland Act of
1998 (an Act of the UK Westminster Parliament), and
launched on March 1, 1999.1 It replaced the Standing Ad-visory
46. Id. at 5-6.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 8-9.
49. See AMMER ET AL., .supra note 43 at I 16.
50. See EQUINLT, EQU Iy BODIES AND NATIONAL HUIMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS:
MAKING THE LINK TO MAXIMISL IMPACT 5-7 (2011). This work was underpinned by a
survey of members in June 2011, to which "wentv-five responded. See id. at 9.
51. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 6(8 (Eng.); see.JANL CAMPBELL & MICHAEL
POTTER, RLSEARCH & INTO. SERV., N. IR. ASSEMBLY, PAPER 76/11, NIAR 325-11.
EQUAIVFYAND HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 3, (2011).
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Commission on Human Rights ("SACHR"), and the reform was
firmly linked to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of
1998 and the developing peace process (and the resulting
need for strengthened institutional human rights
protection). The Agreement makes clear that the NIHRC is
intended to have enhanced powers in comparison with SACHR,
and NIHRC was created to be a more effective, independent
and representative institution designed to advance human rights
in the post-conflict context. 52 Its mission is to:
[W]ork vigorously and independently to ensure that the
human rights of everyone in Northern Ireland are fully and
firmly protected in law, policy and practice. To that end the
Commission measures law, policy and practice in Northern
Ireland against internationally accepted rules and
principles for the protection of human rights and will
exercise to the full the functions conferred upon it to
ensure that those rules and principles are promoted,
adopted and applied throughout Northern Ireland.53
"Human rights" are not confined to European Convention
on Human Rights "Convention rights," and the NIHRC grounds
its work within international human rights standards and has
been active with international bodies like the UN and Council
of Europe.54
The Commission's current strategic plan lists three aims:
building and embedding a human rights culture, challenging
and seeking to prevent human rights abuses, and ensuring
organizational effectiveness and efficiency.5
The NIHRC must keep the adequacy and effectiveness of
law and practice in Northern Ireland under review,56 and under
the 1998 Act had to make recommendations for improvement
in terms of its own functions and powers within two years of
52. See Agremcennt Reached in tihe Multi-Part Negotiations, Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10,
1998, 37 I1.-M. 751 (1998).
53. i4ssion Statement, N. IR. Hum. Rms. (OMM'N, http://wnihirc.org/
index.php/who-we-are/vision-mission-and-values (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
54. See What We Do, N. IR. HUM. RTS. COMM'N, http:/iww .nihrc.orgiindex.php/
what-we-do (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
55. N. IR. HUM. RTS. (OMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-13, at 9-11 (2011).
56. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(1) (U.K.).
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establishment. 57 The Commission has the power to advise the
Secretary of State and the Executive Committee of the
Assembly on human rights matters of its own initiative or in
response to a request.5 The NIHRC can provide assistance to
individuals and bring legal proceedings. 59 It is required to
promote understanding and awareness of human rights and, to
that end, can develop research and educational activities.61° The
Secretary of State was also placed under an obligation to request
"Bill of Rights" advice from the Commission. bi The
Commission's powers of investigation were subject to
considerable discussion and were amended.62 The NIHRC
has the power to investigate places of detention, and many
(predictable and problematic) restrictions are placed around this
ability to investigate.
Commissioners, including the Chief Commissioner,
are appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
(a Minister of the UK Government) who must "[ifn making
appointments under this section . . . as far as practicable
secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are representative of
the community in Northern Ireland." 64 The number of
Commissioners is not prescribed. 65 The Commission is
permitted to employ its own staff, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of State. 66 The Commission's Annual Report is
delivered to the Secretary of State, who is required to lay a
copy before Parliament. 7 The Chief Commissioner will not be
57. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(2) (U.K.); see N. I. Hum. Rts. Comrn'n,
Report to the Secretar) of State Required by Section 69(2) of the Northern lreland Act
1998, at 4 (2001). For the government response see N. Ir. Office, The Government's
Response to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Review of Powers
Recommendations 2 (2002).
58. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(3)-(4) (U.K.).
59. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(5) (U.K).
60. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(6) (U.K.).
61. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69(7) (U.K.). For analysis of the Bill of
Rights process that tollowed, seegenerall4 Colin Harvey & Alex Schwartz. Deigmn a Bill
of Rightsfr Northern Ireland, 60 N. IR. LLGAL Q. 181 (2010).
62. Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act, 2007, c. 6, § 15.
63. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 69C (U.K).
64. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 68(3) (U.IK).
65. There are currently lourteen commissioners (in addition to the Chief
Commissioner and Deputy Chief Commissioner).
66. SeeNorthern Ireland AcL 1998, c. 47, sch. 7, [ 4(1) (U.K).
67. See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 7, 5 (U.K.).
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appointed for more than five years at a time, and
Commissioners for three years. 8s
Budget allocation and accountability flows through the
Secretary of State and to the Comptroller and Auditor
General6) A statement of accounts and report are laid before
Parliament. 7°1 The staff is divided into three teams: Education
and Information; Legal, Policy, and Research; and
Corporate Services. The budget (UK£1 million of the
UK£1.69 million is spent on staffing and Commissioners)
of the Commission has recently been subjected to a reduction
of twenty-five percent over a four-year period.71
B. Equality Cor mmission fir Northern Ireland
The ECNI was established by the Northern Ireland Act of
1998 (an Act of the UK Westminster Parliament), and
launched on October 1, 1999. 72 The Act dissolved the Fair
Employment Commission for Northern Ireland, the Equal
Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial
Equality (NI), and the Northern Ireland Disability Council;
their functions now being undertaken by the new
Commission. 73 The ECNI was thus established as a merger of
existing equality bodies, with a view to ensuring a more
coherent, integrated, efficient, and effective approach. In addition
to the existing functions and powers, the ECNI acquired
substantial new responsibilities with respect to section 75 of the
Act (new positive duties on the public sector in relation to
equality and good relations).74
The ECNI describes its vision "of Northern Ireland as a
shared, integrated and inclusive place, a society where
difference is respected and valued, based on equality and
68. See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 7, 2(2) (U. .).
69. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 7, 1[ 7(2) (U.K).
70. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 7, 7(3) (U.K.).
71. See N. IR. HLm. RTs. COMM'N, supra note 55, at p. 6 (U.K.).
72. Northern Ireland Act. 1998, c. 47 § 73 (U.K); see EQLAL. COMMN FOR N. IR.,
ANNUAL REPORT AN) ACCOUNTS 2009-2010, at 1 3 (2010).
73. See id.
74. See Christopher McCrudden. Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of
Aurthern Ire(land, 22 FORDHAM INT'lI -J. 1696, 1765 (1998).
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fairness for the entire communitv." 75 Its mission is stated to be
"[t]o advance equality, promote equality of opportunity,
encourage good relations and challenge discrimination
through promotion, advice and enforcement." 7 The
work of the Commission includes promoting
affirmative or positive action, overseeing relevant statutory
duties, as well as keeping legislation under review. It produces
a corporate plan every three years.77
The duties and powers of the ECNI are an amalgamation
of the pre-existing regimes, and the powers and duties
legislated for since its establishment. The continuing absence of
a Single Equality Act in Northern Ireland makes for a complex
legal and policy picture (and, having once been in advance of
Britain, Northern Ireland, has now fallen behind on legislative
progress).78 The ECNI powers include: advice and assistance to
complainants, investigation and enforcement, promotion of
equality and good relations, research, overseeing the public
sector statutory duty (§ 75), and reviewing equality legislation. '
The scope, scale and extent of these powers are considerable (but
also familiar in terms of other similarly placed institutions), so a
few themes will be drawn out here.
First, as no harmonization has taken place, powers differ
depending on the equality ground, for example, areas where a
formal investigation may be undertaken. An understanding of the
precise law surrounding each area is thus required before assessing
the Commission's duties and powers. Second, the fair
employment regime in Northern Ireland consists of several
distinctive features, with respect to equality in the composition
75. About Us. EQUAL.( OMM'N FOR N. IR., http://www.equaliyni.org/scCions/
deIaultasp?secid() (last visitd Apr. 10, 2012).
76. See id.
77. See generalA EQUAL. (OMM'N FORN. IR., CORPORATE PLAN 2009-2012 (2009).
78. The extensive legislative framework can be found at The Legislation, EQUAL.
COIM'N FOR N. IR, http:/iwww.equalityni.org/sections/delault.asp-nms=The%201.aNT
Thc%20cgislation&cmsid-4 278&id-278&sccid-5 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). For
discussion of a Single Equality Act for Northern Ireland see OFF. OF THE FIRST &
DEPUTY FIRST MINISTER. A SINGLE EQUALIY BILL FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 9 (2004);
EoUAL. (OMM'N FOR N. IR., RESPONSE TO OFMDFM CONSULTATION PAPER, 'A SINGLE
EQUALITY BILL FOR NORTHERN IREI AND' 6 (2004).
79. See Comrmission Powers. EQUAL. (OMM'N FORN. IR., htup:,'//w.cqualiyni.org/
.asp?cns-Th cLawC orn missionpowers&c mid-4_279&id- 279&sccid-5 (last visited Apr.
10, 2012).
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of workforces and the requirements on employers. Third, the
positive duties placed on public authorities by § 75 are
overseen by the Commission (including the option of
investigation), and while the general public law remedy of
judicial review cannot be ruled out (and has been used), the
regime appears to envisage ultimate enforcement resting with
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 0
Commissioners, including the Chief Commissioner,
are appointed by the Secretary of State, who must "in making
appointments under this section, . . . as far as practicable
secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are representative of
the community in Northern Ireland."81 There is a provision for
dismissal of a Commissioner, including, "that he has without
reasonable excuse failed to discharge his functions for a
continuous period of three months beginning not earlier than
six months before the day of dismissal ....
The ECNI must have between fourteen and twenty
Commissioners. " The Chief Commissioner cannot be
appointed for more than five years at a time, and
Commissioners three years.84 The Commissioners are appointed
by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.8 5 The ECNI meets
in plenary each month, and its Committees include an Audit
and Risk Committee. The Commission's budget plans and
expenditure against targets are approved and monitored by the
(devolved) Northern Ireland Executive's Office of the First
Minister and deputy First Minister ("OFMdFM"). 8 6 Its Annual
Report is provided to the OFMdFM, laid before the Northern
Ireland Assembly, and a copy sent to the Secretary of State.8 7 The
annual budget from government was UK-7.3 million in 2009-10
80. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 75, sch. 9 (U.K.); see In the Matter of an
Application by JR1 for Judicial Review. [2011] NIQB 5. 1[[ 27-28 (N. Ir.); In the Matter
of an Application by Peter Neill iorJudicial Review [2006] NICA 5, 1 27-28 (N. It.); In
the Matter of an Application by Peter Neill for Judicial Review [2005] NIQB 66. 1[ 48
(N. Ir.).
81. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 73(4) (U.K.).
82. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 8, 2(4)(a) (U.K).
8 3. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 73 (2) (U.K£).
84. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 8, 2(2) (U.K.).
85. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 § 73(2) (U.K)
86. See EoUAL. (C OMM'N FOR N. IR., supra note 72.
87. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 8, 5 (U.K.).
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and £6.9million in 2010-11. The Commission may appoint its
own staff, subject to approval on numbers and terms and
conditions from OFMdFM and the Department of Finance
and Personnel.8 9 The Commission employs over 140 staff.90
Financial accountability is through OFMdFM and the
Comptroller and Auditor General, and reports must be laid
before the Assembly.91
C. Equality and Human Righits Commiission (Great Britain)
The EHRC was established by the Equality Act of 2006 (an
Act of the UK Westminster Parliament), and launched on
October 1, 2007.92 Its creation led to the dissolution of the
Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial
Equality (which had a race equality and good relations remit),
and the Disability Rights Commission -3 Like all other such
bodies in the UK, it was created during the term of office of a
Labour government at Westminster. Its work covers England,
Wales, and Scotland, with devolution competencies
acknowledged and respected. For example, it is not empowered
to take human rights action where the Scottish Parliament has
legislative competence.94
The overarching political context was the decision to
integrate several existing equality bodies, combined with a
commitment to an institutional home for equality on grounds of
age, religion and belief, and sexual orientation (driven by an EU
Directive requiring legislative protection from discrimination on
those grounds), and for human rights (for which no statutory
body had been established following enactment of the 1998
Human Rights Act). The objective was to produce a more
coordinated, effective, and efficient approach to equality,
88. See (CAMPBELL & POTTER, supra note 51. at 3; see also EQUAL. (OMM'N FORN.
IR., supra note 75, at 87; see also Reaching Out to the Whole Community, Equality
(otinm'n for Northern Ireland
89. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, sch. 8, 1[ 4 (U.K.).
90. See CAMPBEI I & POTTER, s p'a note 51, at 3.
91. See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47. sch. 8, 1[ 7 (Eng.).
92. Equali). Act, 2006, c. 3, § 1 (U.K); see Colin O' inncide. The Commissio) for
Equality and Human Rigts: A New Irnstitutior for ew and (Incertain Times, 36 INDU .IL
141, 141 (2007).
93. See O'( innide, sup a note 92, at 142.
94. EqualityVAct, 2006, c. 3, § 7(l) (U.K.).
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human rights, and good relations by bringing these bodies
within one institutional setting. The new Commission works
with an extensive body of law, policy, and practice, including the
recently enacted Equality Act of 2010.
The Equality Act of 2006 places a general duty on the
EHRC to support the development of a society in which
there is respect for several significant principles, including
the protection of individual human rights; the dignity and
worth of individuals; the equal opportunity to participate in
society; and mutual respect between groups based on valuing
diversity, human rights, and equality.95 The Commission must
consult and prepare a strategic plan, and review it at least every
three years. 9 The plan is submitted to the Minister, who then
must lay a copy before Parliament. 97 The Commission is clearly
directed to focus on a timetable and the priorities attached to
it, as well as the principles to be used in agreeing these
priorities. 8 The first Strategic Plan was published in 2009 and
set out the organization's principles and priorities, including
how it would work with other organizations and what it would
deliver 9 The EHRC's Strategic Plan for 2012-15 is, at time of
writing, being concluded following a consultation exercise.
The EHRC's role and remit initially included seeking a new
Equality Act, which was achieved in 2010.10) It also works to
support individuals through specific interventions and cases,
runs a grant program, offers advice and guidance, promotes best
practice approaches, and is required to produce a triennial review
of the state of human rights and equality.' 10 The first such
report, entitled How Fair is Britain?, was published in October
2010,102 and the second, Human Rights Review 2012: How Fair is
95. EqualitAct, 2006, c. 3, § 3 (U.K.).
96. Equality Act, 2006, c. 3, § 4 (U.K).
97. Equahi/ Act. 2006. c. 3, § 4(4) (U.K.).
98. e Equality Act, 2006, c. 3, § 4(l) (U.K.).
99. See geeaAl EOUAL. & Hu-m. RTS. COMM'N, OUR STRATEGIC PLAN 2009-2012
(2009), available at htlp://wNvw.equalithumanrights.com/uploaded-files/
strategicplan2009-2012.pdl
100. See id. at 52; see also Equalit) Act, 2010, c. 15 (U.K).
101. See EQUAL. & HLMi. RTs. COIM'N, supra note 99, at 52-53.
102. See generall EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. CONMM'N, How FAIR IS BRITAIN? EoU'ALIFY,
HUNLXN RIGHTS AN) GOOD RLLATIONS IN 2010: THL FIRST TRIENNIAL RLIEW (2011),
available at hLp://www.ofticial-(ocuiells.gov.uk/docttill/oher/9781842063132/
978 1842063132.asp.
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B~itain ? An Assessment of How Well Public Authorities Protect Human
Rights, was published in March 2012.10"
There are express equality and diversity duties placed on
the EHRC, in addition to the general duty directed towards the
creation of a particular form of society.' 4 These are duties of
promotion, encouragement, enforcement and "work[ing]
towards. ' 1 5 They include: enforcing the equality enactments,
promoting equality of opportunity, understanding and
encouraging good practice on equality and diversity, and
promoting awareness and understanding of rights under
the equality enactments. °{
In relation to equality of opportunity between disabled
persons and others, the Commission is given the power to
promote favorable treatment. 0 7 The legislation lists obligations
that rest on the Commission with respect to members of groups
("group" is defined in the legislation).'I S These include the
importance of good relations, as well as encouraging good
practice. 109
The Commission has responsibilities pertaining to the
promotion and encouragement of human rights, including
raising awareness of human rights and supporting good
practice."" In undertaking its equality and diversity duties, the
Commission is required to take account of relevant human
rights. 1 It is tasked with monitoring the "effectiveness of the
equality and human rights enactments," 12 and has the power to
advise government and to make recommendations on law and
policy reform." -1 The legislation is explicit in requiring that
outcomes be measured against indicators.114 The Commission
103. See EQUAL. & HUM. RTs. COMM'N, HUMAN RIGHTS RL Vw 2012: How FAIR IS
BRITAIN? AN ASSFSSMENT OF How W EiL PUBLIC ANUTHORITIES PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS
(2012).
104. Equality Act, 2006, c.3, §§ 3, 8 (U.K.).
105. Id.§8.
106. Id.107. Id. § 8 (3).
108. Id. §§ 10(l)-(2).
109. Id. § 10(1).
110. Id. § 9(1).111. Id. § 9 (4).
112. Id. § 11(l).
113. Id. § 11 (2).
114. d. §§ 12 (1)(c), (3), (4).
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has information and advice gixing powers,1 5 and may issue codes
of practice. 11 It is empowered to conduct inquiries and
investigations that relate to any of its duties.1 17 An investigation
can only be triggered under the Equality Act of 2010 if the
Commission suspects (for example, as the result of an inquiry)
that a person has committed an unlawful act.I"' In addition to
the potential involvement of courts and tribunals, the
Commission has the power to conclude action plans and
agreements to ensure any unlawful action does not continue.11 9 It
may provide legal assistance to individuals' 20 and has the capacity
to intervene or institute judicial review proceedings, including
in its own name. It can also arrange for the provision of
conciliation services1 21 and has a grant awarding role.1 22 The
public sector duties can be assessed by the Commission, and a
compliance notice issued if a person has failed to comply
with the equality duty.'23
The EHRC is a non-departmental public body ("NDPB").
The sponsoring department is the Government Equalities
Office, now situated within the Home Officei 24 The Commission
consists of not less than ten and not more than fifteen
Commissioners. 125 The Chief Executive is an ex officio
Commissioner. 126 The Secretary of State appoints one person as
Chair and one or more persons as Deputy Chair. 127 A
Commissioner is appointed for not less than two and not more
than five years, with the possibility of re-appointment 2 The
Secretary of State must think that the appointee has experience
115. Id. §§ B3(1) (a), (d).
116. Id. § 14 (not relating to human rights).
117. Id. § 20 (1) (in relation to its inquiry powers).118. Id. §20((2).
119. Id. 22-23 (in relation to the Equality Act).
120. Id. 2 28-29 (in relation to the Equality Act).
121. Id. -§ 27. 46 (in relation to equality-goods and services/ airline
accessibility).
122. Id. § 17.
123. Id. §§ 31-32.
124. Vision and Mission, EQUAL. & HU-M. Ris. COMM'N,
http://www.c(lualityhunai rights.com/about-us/vision-andi-nission (last visited Apr. 9.
2012).
125. Equalit Act, 2006, c.3, sch. 1, 1 (U.K.).
126. Id. sch. 1, [ 1(2).
127. Id. sch. 1, [ 4.
128. Id. sch. 1, 3(2)-(3).
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or knowledge of human rights and non-discrimination, and
have regard for the desirability of the Commissioners together
having this expertise.2 9 The law provides plenty of scope for the
appointment of "non-expert"' Commissioners.13 The terms of
appointment are specified by the Secretary of State, the Chair
having the role of presiding over meetings of the Commission. 131
The Secreta7 of State has the power to dismiss a Commissioner
"who is, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, unable, unfit or
unwilling to perform his functions."13 2
The Commission operates in Britain, but not in Northern
Ireland. The Commission s strategic plan, as well as its Annual
Report, must be sent to the Secretary of State, who will lay them
before Parliament. 1 , The following provision regarding the
Commission's statutory independence from government merits
full citation: "The Secretary of State shall have regard to the
desirability of ensuring that the Commission is under as few
constraints as reasonably possible in determining its
activities, its timetables, and its priorities"13 4
The Commission can establish Committees, but must
ensure that the Chair of each Committee is a Commissioner. 135
It must create a Scotland Committee -3 and a Wales Committee,
with a Commissioner Chair for each. 137 These have defined
functions in relation to the Commission's work in Scotland
and Wales. The Commission is also required to create a
Disability Committee with an extensive range of delegated
powers and a provision for formal review after five years. 138
The Commission is required to ensure that these
Committees have sufficient resources to exercise their
functions.
129. Id. sch. 1, 2.
130. Id. sch. 1. -[ 2.
131. Id. sch. 1, 1[ 4.
132. Id. sch. 1, 3.
133. Id. § 4.
134. Id. sch. 1. 42(3).
135. Id. sch. 1, 12.
136. Id. sch. 1. 16. See generalAy EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM'N, Scotland Business
Plan 2011112 (2011 ).
137. Equaliy Act, 2006, c. 3, sch. 1, 17, 24-25 (U.K.).
138. Id. sch. 1, 49, 52, 57. See EQUAL. & HUM. RTs. (OM1'N, PRIORITILS AND
WORK PROGRAMML 2011/12: PLAN OF THL EQUyJAxY AND HUMAN RiGHTS COMMISSION
I)ISABTLFY COMMITTEF 4, 17 (2012).
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The Commission is empowered to regulate its own
proceedings 1-' and to appoint its own staff, with conditions
attached.1 40 The Secretary of State's consent is required for the
appointment of the Chief Executive, and the Secretary of State
has ultimate authority regarding the number of staff and their
terms and conditions.14 ' The Commission has employed over
400 staff, but as a result of extensive budget cuts this has
been subject to significant reduction.1 4 The Commission's
Annual Budget is set by government (approved by
Parliament) and in 2009 to 2010 was UKM70 million 143 but it
has since been reduced significantly. The Secretary of State is
responsible for determining the remuneration of the Chair,
Deputy Chair, and Commissioners including travel,
pension, allowances, or gratuities. 144
The Commission is required to keep proper accounting
records and must prepare a statement of accounts for each
financial year and send it to the Secretary of State and the
Comptroller and Auditor General. 145 The latter must
examine and certify the accounts, laying the statement and
report before Parliament 1 46
D. Scottish Human Rights Commission
The SHRC was established by the Scottish Commission
for Human Rights Act 2006 (an Act of the devolved Scottish
Parliament), and launched on UN Human Rights Day,
December 10, 2008.147 Its strategic plan for 2008 to 2012 lists
four goals: "[tlo build upon an inherent sense of fairness
that already exists in Scotland and develop a sustainable
139. Equalit Act, 2006, c.3, sch. 1, 5, (U.K.).
140. Id. sch. 1, 1[ 7.
141. Id.
142. See Commission OutQnes Pha nsjoP Futuute and LaunchesStajfConsqultation, EQUAL.
& HMt N. RPTS. COMM'N (June 21, 2012), http:i/wwT.equalityhiimanrights.com Inewsi
2012 June/ comnission-outlins-plans-for-f turc-and-launchcs-stafi fconsultatiol.
143. See Annual Reports, EQUAL. & HUM. RTS. COMM'N (July 26, 2012),
http://ww.cqualiyhumflanrights.comi/about-us/corporate-rcpor ring/annual-reports.
144. Equality Act, 2006, c.3. sch. 1, [ 35 (U.K.).
145. Jd.sch. 1, 40.
146. Id. sch. 1, 1[ 40(4).
147. See Scotish Commission for Human Rights Act, 2006, (A.S.P. 16) (SCoL.); see
also SCOT. HUM RTS. .COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN 2008-2012 6, 9 (2009).
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human rights culture; ... [T]o ensure human rights is at the
heart of law, policy and practice in Scotland; . . . [T]o
implement effective governance within SHRC; ... [And]
[tbo meet our international responsibilities .... 14s The
SHRC is, at time of writing, consulting on its Strategic Plan for
2012 to 2016, and, following an extensive research project,
working on the development of a National Action Plan for
Human Rights in Scotland.
The SHRC is under a general duty to promote human fights
and "in particular, to encourage best practice in relation to
human rights." 149 "Human rights" refers to rights in the
European Convention on Human Rights as well as to those in
any relevant treaty that the UK has ratified.150 In deciding upon
what action to take, the Commission must have regard for the
"rights of those groups in society whose human rights are not,
in the Commission's opinion, othewise being sufficiently
promoted." 151 The Commission is empowered to undertake
information, guidance, research, education, and training roles
in relation to its general duty.152 It can review law and practice
with a view to recommendations for change, 15-, but it has no
power to assist with claims or with legal proceedings. 154 It can
intervene in civil proceedings and make submissions 155 and has
the power to conduct an inquiry into Scottish public
authorities-although not to UK authorities in Scotland
(such as an immigration detention centre).1 56 The SHRC
may enter and inspect those detentions centers that are
within its power to investigate. 157
The Chair of the Commission is appointed by Her Majesty
on the nomination of the Scottish Parliament,158 with other
members appointed by the Parliament. 159 The Commission
148. See SCOT. HUM. RTS. COMM'N, supra note 147, at 7.
149. Scottish Commnission for Human Rights Act, 2006, (A.S.P. 16), § 2(1) (Scot.).
150. Id. § 2(2).151. Id. § 2 (4).
152. Id. § 3(1).15. Id. § 4(l).
154. Id. § 6 (1).
155. Id. § 14(2).
156. Id. § 8 (1). For the relevant restrictions see § 9.
157. Id. § I 1 (1).
158. Id. sch. 1, 1(2).
159. idl. sch. 1, 1I 1(3).
HUMAN RIGHTS AN\D EQUALITY
presents its Strategic Plan to the Scottish Parliament. 11 The
following section merits citation: "The Commission, in the
exercise of its functions, is not to be subject to the direction or
control of-any member of the Parliament, any member of the
Scottish Executive, or the Parliamentary corporation. '1 1
However, it is possible for a member to be removed from
office by the Scottish Parliament for listed reasons, including
that the Parliament has lost confidence in the member (a
special voting procedure applies). 1 2 The legislation explicitly
states that the Commission can do anything connected to the
purpose of the exercise of its functions. 163 The Commission may
appoint its own staff, with numbers and terms and conditions
approved by the Parliament164
The SHRC consists of a Chair and up to four other
members (there are currently four members of the Commission,
inclusive of the Chair).'165 Each member is appointed for a single
term of eight years and may not be re-appointed. 1( The
Commission met nine times in 2010 and on ten occasions in
2011. The Scottish Parliament is required to pay the costs of the
Commission and does so through direct funding from the
Scottish Budget Act each year. 167 Financial accountability is
through the Parliament and the Auditor General for Scotland.'68
For example, the Parliamentary corporation must designate the
accountable officer (currently the Chair), and the
Commission must seek the approval of the Parliamentary
corporation for its budget.1 9 The Commission has an annual
budget of UK£960,000, a reduction from previous years.170
160. M. § 7(1).
161. Id. sch. 1 [ 3(1).
162. Id. sch. 1, 5(3)-(6).
163. Id. sch. 1. [ 8(1).
164. Id. sch. 1. [ 11(1)-(2).
165. Id. sch. 1, 1(1).
166. Id. sch. 1. 1[ 5(1), amended by Scottish Parliamentary Commissions and
Commissioners etc. Act, 2010, (A.S.P. 11). sch. 6, 1[ 5.
167. Scottish Commission for Human Rights Act, 2006, (A.S.P. 16) , sch. 1,
14(1) (Scot.).
168. Id. sch. 1, [[ 13-15.
169. Id. sch. 1, 13(l), 14(2).
170. See generally. Scottish Hum. Rts. (onillln, Strategic Plan 2012-2016,
I LLp: //ww. scot1ish urnanrig is.coi d/application/ rcsourccs/ docuncn /FinalSHRC_
Strategicdlan_2012-16.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
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In addition to the Chair and the Commissioners, the
Commission has ten staff members divided into three
teams: Legal and Strategy, Communication and Outreach,
and Business Management.171
E. Irish Human Rights Commission
The IHRC was established by the Human Rights
Commission Act of 2000 (an Act of the Irish Parliament, the
Oireachtas), as amended by the Human Rights Commission Act
2001.172 It is now subject to the merger process of the human
rights and equality bodies ongoing in Ireland. 173 There had
been discussion regarding the establishment of the
organization for some considerable time in Ireland (including
a Constitution Review Group recommendation in 1996 that
such an institution be established 7 4), but as with the NIHRC
and ECNI the political dynamic for its creation can be
directly traced to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of
1998, and the commitments undertaken there by the
Irish Government. 175 The objective was to create a national
human rights institution that would focus on the domestic
protection and promotion of human rights. The surrounding
context includes the Irish Constitution, with its human rights
guarantees, and legislation such as the European Convention on
171. Id.
172. Human Rights Commission Act 2000 (Act No. 9/2000) (I.), (wvflable (d
http://wNw.irishstatutebook.ie/2/00/en/act/pub/0009/index.hml; Humian Rights
Commission (Amendment) Act 2001 (Act No. 35/2001) (Ir.), available at
http:/iwwv.i-ishsttitebook.iei200 I/en/actipub/0035,index.html.
173. See Government to Establish a New Enhanced Human Rights and Equality
Commissio -- Shatte, GOv'T OF IR.,. DEPT OF JUST. & EQUAL. (Sept. 9, 2011),
http:/i/w7wwN.iniis.gov.ie.
174. See (ONSTITUTION REVIEW GRP., REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION REVIEW
GROLP 408 (1996). Following this report an All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the
Constitution was established and published a number of progress reports. The
Oireachtas has also established a Committee on the lmpleinentation of the Good
Friday Agreement which has. tor example, considered the work of the Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission on the Bill of Rights process, see Bill ofJRigtsfor
Northern Ieland: Discussion with the NIHRC, HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, JOINT COMM.
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT DEBATE, (Apr. 30, 2009),
http: //debates.oireachtas.ie /(F/ 2009 /4 /30 /0000 3.asp.
175. See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Ir.-U. K, Apr. 10,
1998, 37 LL.M. 751 (1998), § 9, where the Irish Government committed to the
establishment of a body with an equivalent mandate and remit to the NIHRC
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Human Rights Act of 2003, which gave further effect to
Convention rights in Irish law at the sub-constitutional level.
The Commission was formally launched in July 2001, following
extended discussion of its composition and disagreement over
the initial appointments.17 6
The role of the IHRC is to promote and protect the human
rights of everyone in Ireland. The Commission is given a remit
that includes the rights, liberties, and freedoms in the Irish
Constitution as well as international human rights
instruments.1 77 The priorities of the Commission are reflected in
its current strategic plan. 178 The plan states: "The mission of the
IHRC is to promote and sustain the realization, protection and
awareness of human rights, equally, for all, in law, in policy, and
practice." 179
The IHRC is required to keep the adequacy and
effectiveness of law under review and, if requested, to provide
its views on legislative proposals. 180 It may make
recommendations to government on improving human
rights protection in Ireland.181 It has the power to conduct
inquiries ,s2 and to provide legal assistance to individuals,
including legal advice and representation.' 3 It is also able to
institute legal proceedings "in respect of any matter concerning
the human rights of any person or class of persons," with
rights linked to domestic pro-isions.18 4
The Human Rights Commission Act of 2000 provides:
"The Commission shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be
176. For an emphasis on the importance of appointnents in this context See IR.
COUNCIL FOR CII LIBERTIES, SUBMISSION BY THE IRISH COUNCIL OF Civil ILIBERTIES
TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ANT
EQUALITY COMMISSION 5 (2011). See Carol Coulter, Rights Body Head to Quit for Reasons
of Health, Irish Times, Apr. 4, 2002, available at, http://www.irishtimes.cor/
newspaper/ireland/2002/043(0/1017357779374.html
177. Human Rights Commission Act 2000 (Act No. 9/2000) § 2 (Ir.), available at
http: iwww rishst3titebook.iei 2000/ en /acti pib/ 0009 index.html.
178. See IR. HUM. RTS. COMM'N, PROMOTING & PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN
IRELAND 17 (2007). The first strategic plan was published in November 2003.
179. See id. at 5.
180. Human Rights Commission Act 2000 (Act No. 9/2000) § 8 (Ir.), available at
http: //ww. irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/ act/pub/ 0009/index.hml.
18 1. Id§ 8(d).
184. Id. §§ 8(f), 9.183. Id. § 10.
184. d. § I 1(1).
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independent in the performance of its functions." 185 The
legislation also makes explicit that it shall have all such powers
that are necessary or incidental to the performance of its
functions. I86 The Commission is appointed by the
Government, with the legislation stating that a person shall
not be appointed unless "suitably qualified for such
appointment."1 87 Special provision is made in relation to judicial
appointments to the position of President of the Commission.188
The terms and conditions of appointment are provided by
the Government 8 9 and the "Government, in making any
appointments under this section, shall have regard to the need
to ensure that the members of the Commission broadly reflect
the nature of hish society.' '1 1
The Commission must consist of a President and not more
than fourteen members, with gender balance.'0 ' The term of
office of a Commission member may not exceed five years, with
eligibility for re-appointment.9 2 The Commission meets once a
month, and meets with the NIHRC on the all-Ireland Joint
Committee for Human Rights. -h
The Commission shall appoint a Chief Executive, with terms
and conditions approved by the Minister (the sponsoring
department currently being the Department of Justice and
Equality), and the consent of the Minister of Finance. 194 The
responsibilities of the Chief Executive are to manage the
staff, administration, and business of the Commission,195 with
185. Id. § 4(2).
186. Id. § 4(4).
187. Id. 5(4).
188. Id. §§ 5(5), (6). The first President of the Commission was Mr. Justice Donal
Barrington, a retired Supreme Court judge.
189. Id. § 5(8).
190. Id. § 5(12).
191. Id. § 5(1)-(2) amended by Human Rights Commission (Aiendnent) Act 2001
(Act No. 35/2001) § I (It.), available at http:/iwwwi.ishstitiitebook.ie/200 /en/acti
pub/0035/index.html.
192. Human Rights Commission Act 2000 (Act No. 9/2000) § 5(7)-(8) (Ir.),
available at http :/i wwT.irishstatutebook.ie /2000/ en/ act/ pub 0009 /index.html.
193. Joint Committee NIHIRC &. IHRC. N. IR. HLIM. RTS. COMMN,
http://wwnihrc.org/index.php/working-with-others/joint-committe-nihrc-and-ihrc
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
194. Human Rights Commission Act 2000 (Act No. 9/2000) § 12(1)-(2) (It.),
available at I!Ltp: //www.irishsLatutebook.ic/ 2000// act/ pub/ 0009 /index.hliil.
19. Id. § 13(1).
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responsibility to the Commission for the performance of
these functions. 1% The Chief Executive is responsible for
reporting to the Public Accounts Committee, and is expressly
prohibited when so reporting from expressing an
opinion on government policy or a Minister in relation to a
policy. 19
7
The Minister, with the consent of the Minister for Finance,
funds the Commission from the departmental budget'"8 and,
with the consent of the Minister for Finance, is responsible
for approving the accounts of the Commission.199 Accounts
must be submitted to the Comptroller and Auditor General,
with this report provided to the Minister before being
shown to the Oireachtas.2 0
The Commission currently has provision for seventeen staff
members (seven posts are frozen, due to cuts, and three posts
are funded by a philanthropic organization) with two Directors
overseeing Enquiries, Legal Services, and Administration; and
Research Policy and Promotion. In recent years, the budget
of the Commission has been cut by around thirty-two percent.
In 2009, the Commission had an annual budget of approximately
EUCL5 million (compared with EUC2.3 million in 2008 and
EUCI.3 million in 2002).
F. Equality Authority, Ireland
The Equality Authority (EA) was established in 1999 under
the Employment Equality Act 1998 (an Act of the
Oireachtas). ' 1 It replaced the Employment Equality Agency,
established in 1977 and is now, like the IHRC, subject to the
ongoing merger discussions. The functions and powers of the
EA have subsequently been amended by a series of legislative
measures. The formal context was the aim of raising awareness
196. Id. § 13(2).
197. Id. § 14.
198. Id. § 22.
199. Idl. § 16.
200. Id.
201. Employment Equality Act 1998 (Act No. 21/1998) § 38 (Ir.), aUvailable at
http://wNN".irishstatutcbook.ic/1998/en/act/pub/0021/index.hml; see About Us: The
Role and Functions of the Equalih
, 
Authority, EQu AL. Al TH., htLp://'WW.cqualiy.ic/cn/
About-Us/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
2012] 1645
1646 FORDHAM IN\ATERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1615
of equality law and policy; building an evidence base; being
proactive with, for example, employers; as well as ensuring
enhanced access at the domestic level to anti-discrimination
lawi12 The political origins can be traced to the 1980s, with the
work of the Labour Party on an Equal Status Bill gaining wider
support, and leading to the emergence of a general consensus
on the need for such a new institution. The establishment of the
separate Equality Tribunal should also be noted as part of both
the context and the development of equality law in Ireland. °0 3
The EA is required to submit a three-year plan for
approval to the Minister, addressing objectives, outputs and
strategies. 2°4 The latest strategic plan was published in 2009.215
The document describes the authority's mission as "to
promote equality of opportunity and to eliminate
discrimination." 2 Its role and remit are set out in the
legislative framework and include eliminating
discrimination as provided in domestic law and promoting
equality of opportunity in, for example, the provision of
goods and services, accommodation, and education. 2°7 It
must also keep the relevant legislation under review.208 One of
its strategic goals is to achieve "[a ] n effective and efficient Equality
ANuth-ority."1209-
The EA may invite a business or groups of businesses to
conduct an equality review-an audit and examination of the
current situation, practices, procedures and other matters-or
it can conduct the review itself, and it may request that an
equality action plan be prepared (a programmatic indication of
change). 2"° There is potential judicial enforcement of these
202. See BrieJ Profite, EQU INET El ROPE (2012), http:/iwww.equineteurope.orgi
1MG/pdt PROFLE_EA IE.pdtE
203. See generallY EQUAL. TRIBUNAL, htp:// ww.Cqualit~ribunal.ic (last visited
Apr. 14, 2012).
204. Employment Equalit) Act 1998 (Act No. 21/1998) § 40 (It.), available at
http: //www. irishstatuLcbook.ie/1998/en/ act/pub/ 0021 index.hml.
205. See generally EQUA. AUTH., STRATEGIC PLAN 2009-2011 (2009).
206. See id at 8.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 10.
210. Employment Equality Act 1998 (Act No. 21/1998) § 69 (It.), available at
http:/iwwv.irishstatiitebook.iei 1998/eniactipub/0021 iindex.html.
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provisions. 211 The EA may provide draft codes of practice if
requested to do so by the Minister212 and research related to its
functions.213 It may conduct an inquiry, and can be required to
do so by the Minister. 2 14 Again, as with other bodies, these
powers come with tailored procedural requirements, 2 5 as
well as the ability to issue non-discrimination notices.216The
legislation also includes a number of offences in relation to
inquiries, for example a failure to supply information21 7
The legislation makes provision for the establishment of a
Director of Equality Investigations2 8 to whom complaints of
discrimination can be taken. The EA is also empowered to refer
matters to the Director (for example, that discrimination or
victimization is being generally practiced against persons).219 The
legislation provides detailed provision for securing relevant
information. 220
Members of the EA are appointed by the Minister.2 1 The
EA's strategic plan must also be submitted to and approved by
the Minister, who must lay this before each House of the
Oireachtas. 222 The terms and conditions of the chairperson are
set by the Minister with the consent of the Minister of
Finance,223 and the Minister may remove the chair at any, time for
"stated reasons," 224 conditions for which are provided. 225
Other members of the EA are appointed by the Minister, with
provision for sectoral nomination.2b
The EA must consist of twelve members, at least five of
whom should be male and five female2 27 The Chair is appointed
211. Id. § 72.
212. Id. § 56.
213. Id. § 57.
214. Id. § 58.
215. Idt. § 59.
216. Id. §§ 62-65.
217. Id. § 6 7.
218. idt. § 75.
219. Id. §85.
220. Id. §§ 94-97.
221. Idt. § 41.
222. Id. § 40.
223. Id. § 42.
224. Id. § 42(4).
225. Id. § 43(3), including that the chair should be ordinarily resident in the state.
226. Id. § 44.
227. Id. § 41.
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for a period of not more than four years, with terms and
conditions and remuneration determined by the Minister with
the consent of the Minister for Finance 2 28 The EA is empowered
to appoint Advisory Committees22 Provision is made for the
appointment of a Chief Executive, with the consent of the
Minister, comparable to the Irish Human Rights
Commission, with similar accountability and reporting
arrangements2" The Minister, after consultation with the EA
and with the approval of the Minister for Finance, is given
power of appointment over all staff (currently thirty-five staff),
including grades and number of staff in each grade.2- The
auditing and accounting arrangements are similar to the IHRC232
The EA has experienced significant budget cuts in recent years,
with the government budget reducing its income by 43
percent: EUC5,897,000 to EUC3,333,000.
V. COMMONALITY AUVD CONTRAX STS
The framing context for all these bodies is extensive and
complicated in law and policy. However, it is possible to tease
out broad commonalities and contrasts. Only two of the bodies
could be said to be entirely "new" entities at the time of their
creation: the SHRC and the IHRC. Although framed in the post-
conflict context of a new beginning to human rights in
Northern Ireland, NIHRC followed on from SACHR. In Ireland
the LA replaced the Employment Equality Agency, and the
LHRC and ECNI are primarily the results of mergers. There was
much existing experience to draw on-in terms of practical
lessons already available and occasionally learned. Even the
"new" commissions were potentially able to benefit from the
experiences of other bodies nationally and internationally.
There were rich sources of insight and support available.
Nevertheless, the challenges associated with merging bodies with
their own pre-existing structures and cultures cannot be
overstated.
228. Id. § 42.
229. Id. § 48.
230. Id. §§ 49-50.
231- Id. § 51.
232. idl. §§ 53-55.
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Vider political context matters to this analysis. It is worth,
for example, underlining that the political parties that led the
legislative process resulting in these changes are no longer
governing parties. In the UK, the Labour Party was replaced by a
Conservatixe-Liberal Democrat Coalition in 2010; in Scotland,
the Liberal-Labour coalition that adopted the 2006 Act was
replaced by the Scottish National Party; in Ireland, the Fianna
Fail led government was in 2011 replaced by a Fine Gael-Labour
Party Coalition. Although many of the parties in Northern
Ireland contributed significantly to the peace process, the
dominant partners in the power-sharing administration-the
SDLP and UUP-have been steadily overtaken by Sinn Fein and
the DUP. The impact of this is variable, and need not result in
less of a commitment to such institutions, but it may encourage
proposals and initiatives for reform as new governments seek to
make a distinctive contribution to the emerging debates.
In constitutional law, the United Kingdom and Ireland are
unitary states, and both are member states of the EU, as well as a
large range of intergovernmental organizations. The SHRC is
the only Commission not created by the "primary legislature;" it
was established by the devolved Scottish Parliament. In the
United Kingdom, this has legal and other constitutional
implications that retain their significance. The majority of the
bodies (four of six) are accountable to a Minister located again
within the "dominant legislature:" Westminster Parliament or
Oireachtas. 2 , The LCNI and SHRC are accountable in the
devolved setting: to OFMdFM and the Scottish Parliament
respectively-with the ECNI in the intriguing position that the
appointment of the Chief Commissioner and Commissioners is
still made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, even
though accountability is to OFMdFM.
All the bodies have "boards" of commissioners, rather than
a single commissioner model, appointed for varying and fixed
terms, with the Chair usually a full-time appointment. The legal
requirements on composition include, for example,
"representative of the community" (NIHRC and ECNI) and
"gender balance" (IHRC and LA).
233. There is now, however, a proposal that the new merged Human Rights and
EqualiLy Commission in Ireland will be accountable to lhe Oireachas scc ilL. 1 above,
Report of the Merger Working Group.
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The majority of bodies, with the exception of the SHRC,
have budgets determined by the relevant Minister and
sponsoring department or executive, and all six have been
impacted by the current challenging budgetary context.
All six share a range of functions on promotion, advice,
investigations, inquiries, legal proceedings and the provision of
assistance. Additionally, all participate in international, regional,
and transnational networks. The NIHRC and the IHRC are
formally linked through a Joint Committee of the two
Commissions and have worked on, for example, a charter of
rights for the island of Ireland.23 4 Although details differ, and
there is disagreement on how acceptable the limits are, for the
majority of bodies their remit, role, functions, and powers range
widely and vary primarily in degree. For example, the equality
remits tend to be accompanied by more specific and robust
enforcement mechanisms.
V. FACTORS THAT IMIPACT THE OPERATION OF THE
CO MMI SSIONS
A. Establishment and Context
The first question is whether the context in which the body
was established, and has operated since, has had a significant
influence on the extent of its ability to deliver on its mandate.
The international and domestic context, together with a
commission's institutional history, necessarily impacts on its
remit, powers, accountability mechanisms, and structure. It is
also the environment in which a commission operates in its
early days. The question is how determinative that origin has
been of its later operation. Questions for consideration range
from the extent to which the international context and the
Paris Principles in particular impacted on its powers,
independence, and accountability mechanisms, to the impact
234. See (OV'T OF IR., JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE REPRESENTATVES OF THE IRISH
HUNLAN RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THL NORTHLRN IRELAND HUNLAN RIGHTS
(OMMISSION, PRE-CONSULTAT1ON PAPLR ON A (HARTER oF RIGHTS FOR THL ISLAND OF"
IREI AND (2003), available at
http: //ww .ihrc.ic/ dowinload/ doc/ papcr_cihartcr-of rights.doc; see also Suzannc Egan
& Rachel Murray, Casting a Cold L£ e on the Origins and Development of an All-Island Chart¢er
of Rights, 34 FORDHAM INT'l I 78, 80| (2010).
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of establishment through a merger of precursor bodies. In
subsequent years, has the external context largely remained as
it was when the body was established, or been transformed in
the intervening period? Are there key international and
domestic factors that have been formative, and have the
commissions been able to influence the environment in which
they are operating or proved able to deliver despite its
constraints?
1. Domestic Context
In the seminar discussion and interviews we conducted
there was some consistency across the jurisdictions in the themes
that emerged. The first was that the domestic political context in
which a commission is established is highly significant in
determining the particular remit, powers, and structure of the
body. It is also central to the importance that government and
stakeholders attach to the differing dimensions of a
commission's mandate and the expectations to which the
commission responds. The NIHRC, for instance, with its
mandate in the aftermath of the Belfast (Good Friday)
Agreement to advise on a Bill of Rights, was expected to focus
on that potential future provision rather than exclusively on
reforms that the existing (but imperfect) Human Rights Act of
1998 could deliver. The prior existence of, and political support
for, separate equality bodies was a factor in the political context
for merged bodies. This is especially true with EHRC, where
supporters of the relatively newly established Disability Rights
Commission were keen to ensure that people with disabilities
continued to control commission policy in their field and
secured a statutory disability committee within the EHRC with
certain executive powers to that end2 5
In Northern Ireland, a dominant context for the NIHRC
and ECNI was the peace process, in which it had been evident
that enhanced institutional and substantive commitments to
rights and equality would have to form one element of any
agreement. Its historical legacy, devolution arrangements, and
prior institutional architecture resulted in two separate
235. See Sarah Spencer, Equality and Human Rights Commission: A Decade in the
Making, 79 P1O- Q. 6, 10 (2008).
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commissions with a-symmetric accountability mechanisms. The
NIHRC was accountable entirely to the Westminster government
but for the ECNI, to Northern Ireland's own Executive;
although as noted, its Commissioners, counter-intuitively, are
appointed by the Westminster govermment's Northern Ireland
Minister. The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement generated huge
expectations for the new bodies. For ECNI the pressure was
compounded by the challenge of merging existing commissions
and taking on additional responsibilities in relation to the new
duty on the public sector to promote equality, section 75. Both
commissions faced the challenge that human rights and equality
were, for many, particularly within the unionist community,
perceived as part of a partisan, nationalist or republican political
agenda. In a cross-community, power-sharing context, this
divergence of view was always going to pose a dilemma for those
advocating effective implementation, although it is the case that
a lack of consensus on these matters is not confined to post-
conflict "divided societies."
The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement was also pivotal in
Ireland's decision to establish its Human Rights Commission,
albeit that a drive towards modernization of Irish society and its
institutions in that period provided a broader context, as it had
for the earlier Equality Authority, giving it a strong popular, all-
party mandate. For both Irish bodies, the advocacy of civil
society was, as in other jurisdictions, a factor. In Scotland, the
decision to enshrine human rights within the devolution
settlement meant that the Scottish Executive and Parliament
have arguably had a stronger sense of owning a human rights
mandate than their counterparts elsewhere. The politics of the
relationship between Scotland and the Westminster
government, and tendency of Scottish nationalists in particular
to emphasize Scotland's role on the international stage, has
provided a supportive political environment for the Scottish
Human Rights Commissions emphasis on UN human rights
standards and institutions as the context in which it works.
2. International Context
The need for governments ostensibly to respect the Paris
Principles was a factor in decisions on the mandate and
governance of all of the bodies that have a human rights remit,
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and remains a factor, as evident in the UK Government's
reference to the Principles in plans to reform the EHRC. In the
establishment of the Scottish HRC there was direct engagement
by senior UN representatives, contributing to the Parliament's
vision for the body as an institution set within an international
context and informed by the Paris Principles to a greater extent
than might otherwise have been the case. The lack of specificity
in the Principles has, however, left each government
considerable room to maneuver in determining the form that
the body will take, a matter on which we found contrasting
views. While some participants argued that it was time to review
the Paris Principles, others argued that they did not constrain
governments willing to establish an effective body nor limit an
ambitious NHRI delivering on a broader canvas. The European
context has also been a factor: the requirement in EU law that
discrimination law in member states be extended to cover age,
religion and belief, and sexual orientation was a key driver for
the merger of the UK equality bodies, there being neither
appetite nor resources to establish three further equality bodies.
In that sense, establishing the EHRC was, in part, a pragmatic
response to an external EU pressure.
A further factor can be the limited role played by a body
that preceded the commission. The mandate of the Standing
Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland, for
instance, had not enabled it to play a sufficiently effective role
nor to comply with the Paris Principles. In other circumstances,
a merger could, in theory, be used by a government to remove
an organization considered too critical of government itself.
Alternatively, as the Equality Authority in Ireland experienced, a
severe budget cut could be used to the same effect.
3. Mergers
A third, dominant theme is the additional challenges
which, in practice, new commissions face if established through
the merger of existing bodies .23 Merger-whether characterized
as dissolution and replacement or as the bringing together of
236. See EQU INET supra note 50 at 8-9. In the Irish context, see Shatter Announces
Working Group on the Establishment of Enhanced Human Rights and EqualitY Commission,
GOVT 0F IR., DLPARMENT OF .JUSTICE & EoU.L ITY, (October 6, 2011),
http:/iw/ .inis.gov.ie/en jElIRiPagesiPRI 1000188.
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existing bodies-brings tensions internally and in external
relations that can prove divisive. As one participant who had
lived through a merger put it:
The problem with "mergers" as a process is that they cause
competition to retain the features of the previous bodies,
and this overwhelms thinking which has gone into the new
one. Subsequently, those who move across, and the
stakeholders of the previous bodies, look for evidence of the
old body within the new, or make that their benchmark.237
If not well managed, merger can lead to a dilution of the
good work of a predecessor body, reinforcing the concerns of
those who resisted merger and failing to meet the expectations
of those who supported it. Civil society groups may have
expectations only in relation to their own separate identities
rather than in relation to the cross-cutting mandate of the
commission as a whole: a factor that can lead a commission,
post-merger, to maintain separate staff units on issues such as
disability which reflect that model. The merged bodies may have
had little prior experience of working in partnership. Some may
be less willing than others to merge, as was the case for the
Commission for Racial Equality ("CRE") prior to the EHRC,
and hence less engaged in the long term planning and re-
envisioning merger requires. There may also be differing
institutional cultures, staffing practices, and staff and
commissioner profiles: a stronger focus in equality bodies on
personnel with experience as equality and diversity practitioners,
for instance, relative to the emphasis in human rights
commissions on those with legal expertise.
The EHRC in Scotland may have had a more conducive
start than its counterpart in England, for instance, because the
staff of the three commissions in Scotland had worked together
prior to the merger. It had a smaller number of bodies with
which it had to maintain working relationships (just thirty-two
local authorities, for instance), and the three commissions had
for some time worked in partnership with NGOs within a
coordinating group, so that positive, collective relationships
were already established and there was less resistance to merger
as a result.
237. Correspondence wvith authors (Oct. 1, 2011).
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The new body may inherit many of the staff of the previous
commissions and lack resources to appoint staff with skills
relating to new responsibilities, potentially leading to a skills
mismatch. As one contributor to our study said of a merged
body: "We did not determine skill sets. People locked themselves
into the areas of their comfort zone. It was like repackaging
three entities that dominate; new concepts, like age and sexual
orientation, didn't get a hearing. It was a continuation of the
old, and of old bad habits."2 38 On the other hand, voluntary
severance arrangements could leave a whole tier of management
without any staff from the merged commissions, a gap in
expertise sorely felt in the initial phase when the work of those
commissions needed to continue as well as new directions to be
set.
In the case of the EHRC, the inclusion of human rights was
for government, in contrast to many of its counterparts abroad,
an afterthought to the core business of creating a single equality
body-a marginal position which has not yet been entirely
overcome. Human rights was not its "default setting" as one
contributor put it.2 ,2- This had the consequence that its parent
department in government is the Government Equalities Office,
now in the Home Office, not the department responsible for
human rights, the Ministry of Justice. Merger of the equality
grounds within the EHRC, on the other hand, had proved the
catalyst for securing harmonization of equality legislation
through the 2006 and 2010 Equality Acts, an untenable
hierarchy of levels of protection for different sections of society
being politically exposed by the juxtaposition of issues within
one body.
The ECNI's larger precursor commissions, the Fair
Employment Commission ("FEC") and Equal Opportunities
Commission ("EOC"), had differing strategies and working
practices, in part reflecting their differing powers. In broad
terms, the FEC had a significant monitoring role in relation to
employment outcomes, with some focus on formal investigations
and voluntary undertakings to deliver change in employment
practices, relative to a stronger focus in the EOC on evidence-
238. Seminar participant (Mar. 10, 2011).
239. Interv'iew (Oct. 1, 2011).
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based agenda setting to secure policy reform. It took some time
to achieve read-across from the differing approaches to all
equality strands, not least because of the retention of separate
staff units, reflecting external expectations and the differing
expertise of the staff themselves.
4. Operating Environment
The third theme was that the external context-political,
economic, and demographic-has in all cases been a significant
factor in the subsequent operation of the body: the political
context, in the extent of support or opposition to its activity, and
the economic context in setting constraints not only on the
commissions' budgets but on those of the organizations on
which they rely for delivery. Demographically, two factors have
dominated: the aging of the population and hence greater
awareness of the need to address issues related to older people
including age discrimination and social care, and the significant
growth in the migrant population in all four jurisdictions over
the past decade-although the latter appears to have had only
limited impact on the commissions' focus.
In Northern Ireland, the commissions have faced high
expectations of their transformative potential among some
stakeholders but also a significant degree of skepticism,
particularly but not exclusively among Unionist politicians, on
the need for change and on the motivations of those who seek
it. There is no political consensus on the goals at the heart of
the work of either commission. It did not prove possible, for
instance, for the ECNI to secure approval from its government
department, OFMdFM, for its 2009 to 2012 corporate plan.24
Building public and political support for their work remains one
of the commissions' greatest challenges. For the ECNI and the
NIHRC, that political context consistently leads to challenge by
elected representatives, and from time to time from among their
own commissioners. Exercising its regulatory powers on a
regular basis, the ECNI has to be acutely aware of the need to
demonstrate that each step that it takes is within its statutoly
240. See ger eray Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Reaching out to the
Whole Community: C(orporate Plan 2009-12 (2009), available at
hLp://wwxequalilyni.org/archive/pdf/E(NI(,orporateplanO9l2.pdf (introducing the
corporate plan of the ECNI).
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remit and powers, to avoid both political and legal challenge.
This absorbs considerable staff time and can seem overly
cautious to supporters who would like to see it take a more
ambitious approach.
The NIHRC's efforts over ten years to secure a Bill of Rights
for Northern Ireland demonstrate the impact both of high
expectations and of those political divides. In its day-to-day work
it has occasionally been the subject of heated criticism and
personal attack, so that its commissioners and staff have felt a
gulf between the regard in which the Commission is held abroad
and their treatment at home. The relationship with officials in
the Northern Ireland Office, in its early years, was difficult. In
contrast, the SHRC has operated in a political environment with
considerably greater consensus on its role. The political context
of all of the commissions had accorded greater priority to
addressing equality issues than broader human rights, as is
evident in the resources and enforcement powers given to the
equality bodies or to the equality dimension of combined
institutions. The latter may reflect the concern of governments
that enforcement action would be taken against their own
decisions whereas equality law is targeted more broadly on
employers and service providers across the private, public, and
voluntary sectors.
There have been circumstances in which expectations that
the political context would have an impact has proved
unfounded: as in the expectation that developments in Ireland
and Northern Ireland would be mutually reinforcing, pulling
each other forwards because of the requirement of the parity
principle in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. That this has
not happened may point to the importance of a commission
working to retain the supportive elements of the context in
which it was created, as well as the imperative of addressing lack
of support in other respects, and the need for accountability
mechanisms beyond those relating to the performance of the
body itself.
Two of the commissions have related particularly strongly
to the international context in which they work: the NIHRC and
the SHRC. International human rights standards and visible
interest by UN and Council of Europe supervisory bodies have
provided valuable legitimacy to the NIHRCs work when
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consistently challenged in Northern Ireland, arguably at times
encouraging commission personnel to spend a little too much
time abroad in its early years, where the Commission's
experience is greatly valued. In Scotland, situating the HRC in
an international context has matched the aspirations of those
who want Scotland "to be best in class" on the international
scene, the Commission providing opportunities for Scotland to
earn international recognition in the way that a Scottish office of
a Britain-wide body does not. As one contributor put it:
"Whereas debates in London on a 'British Bill of Rights' might
be said to be looking inwards and backwards to the magna carta,
Scotland is looking to the rest of the world.'2'4 Devolution also
creates a sense that Scotland can do things differently from the
way they have been done before and can look beyond the
United Kingdom for inspiration. The fact that coalition
government has been the norm (albeit not currently) has also
made a difference-the commission finding effective support
among minority parties that have leverage beyond their size.
While the context for the establishment of the commissions
and their subsequent operation is thus highly significant ("if it
wasn't for the Good Friday Agreement we would not have got
the ECHR Act in Ireland in 2003"), many of those consulted
nevertheless argued that it is not determinative. Commissions
were not only influenced by the context in which they were
operating, but had the capacity to shape that context in some
respects, including public expectations, the level of political and
public support they could attract, and how well they manage a
merger process. A single catalyzing event, such as the racist
murder of Stephen Lawrence in London, which preceded
strengthening of race equality legislation, or a change in
government, could provide an unexpected opportunity to
secure policy change if a commission were strategic in its
response, although events can also set off a negative discourse
on an issue from which a commission can struggle to emerge.
B. Role and Remit
In relation to the remit and roles of the commissions, a key
question was whether, in those bodies that did embrace both
241. Interview (July 26, 2011).
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equality and a broader human rights remit, this had proved an
effective approach. Wherever the institutional boundaries are
drawn, statutory responsibility for some human rights issues
nevertheless remains separate, in Children's Commissioners for
instance, raising issues of overlapping remits and how these can
be most effectively addressed. A related question was the
implications of including within some of the commissions a
responsibility for community relations.
Beyond the remit set down in statute, the question also
arose whether the way in which the different bodies have
interpreted their roles has been a significant factor in what they
have been able to achieve, for instance in the extent to which
they have seen human rights as a matter of compliance with
international standards or more broadly in relation to
promoting a human rights culture. Despite similar remits, were
we seeing significant differences of emphasis, for instance
between awareness raising and promotion of good practice on
equality on the one hand, and enforcement action on the other?
Do these differences reflect differing perspectives on how to
bring about social change, whether implicit in the decisions
taken or through conscious articulation in a strategic planning
process?
1. A Regulatory Role for the Commissions'
The UK Govermment's recent proposals for reform of the
EHRC suggested that it should "return to" what is perceived as
its core role as a regulatory body, prompting discussion among
participants on the nature of that role and its relationship with
the broader advisory and awareness-raising responsibilities of an
NHRI to develop a human rights culture2 42 The latter role could
come close to lobbying, which a regulatory body could not do,
hence there could be a tension: "Is it right to see them as social
242. See UK GOV'T EQUA S. (OFF., PUB. NO.jN404645, BULDING A FAIRER BRITAIN:
RLFORM OF THE EQUALITYAND HUMAN RIGHTS (OMMISSION 20 (2011). See also. BRITISH
INST. OF I-Ni. RTS., BRIEFING ON "BUILDING A FAIRER BRITAIN: REFORM OF THE
EoUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (IOMMISSION;" WHAT DOLS IT MEAN FOR HUNLAN
RIGHTS? 8 (2011). The new government also decided to cease funding tire EHIRC
helpline and grants programme iollowing a review-see GOV'T EQUALS. OFF., PU B. NO.
JN404529, INFORMATION, ADVICE AND SLPPORT ON EQuAuITY AND HUNLAN RIGHTS
ISSUES 75-76 (2011)-and has commissioned for a new service. The GEO and EHRC
agreed a "Framework Document" in 2011 to outline the nature of their relationship.
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change bodies or regulatory bodies? Managing inequality is
regulatory; promoting equality is making change happen"24,3 It
was suggested that a regulatory body also had to be careful not
to tread on the remit of another regulator (e.g., to challenge a
policing practice that was being investigated by an Inspectorate),
even if the matter raised human rights concerns; but where an
issue did not touch on its role as a regulator, a commission had
greater space in which to play an awareness-raising role.
Regulation nevertheless included promotion of good practice-
hence the boundaries of that role were open to debate. It
should not be interpreted as a narrow law enforcement remit.
There was a fear that the proposed reform of the EHRC would
not only curtail its promotional role, but also limit its flexibility
to choose the approach most likely to deliver change. The term
"regulatory body" might thus be counter-productive in securing
public support. It is unhelpful, one seminar contributor
suggested, for the EHRC "to be treated by Ministers as a body
setting gas prices.' 244 In Scotland, we were told, when the HRC
consulted on its role:
There was incredible good will when people saw how the
Human Rights Commission was approaching its work, on a
culture of human rights, building capacity to put rights into
practice-not acting as a regulator but as an enabler;
empowering people and embedding human rights in
mainstream accountability arrangements in the public
sector.245
2. Institutional Architecture
The institutional architecture of the commissions relative to
other statutory bodies was seen as a significant factor at an
operational level. There was, first of all, devolution-creating
complexity in designing institutions that take account of
243. Seminar participant (Mar. 10, 2011).
244. The regulatory functions of the EHRC are listed as subject to the relevant
sections of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act of 2006. See Legislative and
Regulatol) Reform (Regulator) Functions) Order, 2007, S.I. 2007/3544, §2, sch. pt. 1
(U.K). The EHRCs 2009 entorcement and compliance policy makes express reference
to the 2006 Act and to the Hampton Review and principles 2005. The Commission
makes fr-equent use of the language of "regulation" as a result. See EQUAL. & HUMN. RTS.
C NM'N, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLLANCE POLICY, 3 (2009).
245. Interiew (july 26, 2011).
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devolved and non-devolved matters. In Scotland this resulted in
an institutional arrangement in which "nobody is sure what their
remit is" as every issue will have a devolved dimension. 246 There
is some scope for the bodies to resolve the areas of overlap by
working together. The devolution of legislative responsibility for
equality to Northern Ireland, resulting in differing legislation
from the rest of the United Kingdom, had until recently led to
stronger a provision for equality protections in Northern
Ireland, but now finds it lagging behind the provisions of the
Equality Act of 2010 in Britain-that single equality Act
providing near parity of provisions across equality grounds at a
time when political momentum for such a measure in Northern
Ireland is no longer apparent.
A second key issue in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland is the institutional separation between equality and
human rights commissions, reflecting the dominant influence in
the development of equality and human rights law in both
countries and in domestic and international contexts
respectively. Separating out these mandates into two bodies led
to some overlapping responsibilities in practice, and in relation
to one such separation we were told "it definitely causes
confusion as to where people should turn to if they have a query
or need support.'1247 There are, moreover, significant synergies
among related human rights and equality issues which cannot
be fully explored, for instance when conducting an inquiry
where the commission's mandate does not embrace both issues.
Continuing separation inhibited an effective human rights
remit, including for instance the separation of children's rights
commissions and bodies addressing freedom of information and
those dealing with poverty. As one participant described,
"[T] hat fragmentation has been very damaging. If you take out
one key dimension, society gets fragmented, and policy makers
get fragmented." 24 Another argued: "Equality is a human right.
Might it not be conceivable that it is precisely through bringing
together in a unitary situation, in a properly managed transition,
that we could provide the leadership required to bring an end to
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Seminar participant (Mar. 10, 2011).
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the fragmentation?" 24I Nevertheless, merged equality and
human rights bodies experienced challenges. These reflected a
number of factors including: a lack of expertise on parts of its
mandate, requiring commissioners, in some instances, to play a
more extensive role to compensate; differing cultures and
working practices in relation to equality and human rights law
within the commissions and externally; and poor management
of the merger rather than an inherent incompatibility. A key
factor in relation to the EHRC may be the asymmetry in the
powers relating to the equality and human rights functions. As
one participant told us: "[Tihe HRA is a very limited tool
compared with the Equality Act in terms of achieving
transformative change, hence the scope for legal intervention
on human rights is limited by both the EHRC's powers and by
the scope of the HRA itself."25°1 The cost effectiveness of separate
bodies must also be a consideration. Could more not be
achieved by merger, or could that simply result in governments
taking the opportunity to provide less?
Some argued against further mergers on the grounds that
they were disruptive-"mergers are horrible affairs"-and time
consuming. The benefits of collaboration could be drawn from
closer linkage between separate bodies without full integration.
Moreover, the reality of differing approaches on equality and
human rights did not lend itself to a smooth transition. There
have been some decades of experience operating equality
legislation, but far less experience putting human rights into
practice. There is still less experience in fitting equality and
human rights together. When working with public bodies, for
instance, commissions can find some mutual understanding on
what they are expected to do in relation to equality; but that is
not the case on human rights practice, nor is there the same
underlying acceptance that human rights are for the benefit of
all. "Unifying a philosophical vision should be the first
priority." 25 There are also historic, ongoing tensions and
divisions within the constituency of support for human rights
and equality that cannot be ignored: "Within civil society there
are fears and ongoing perceptions of a hierarchy of priority, fear
249. Id.
250. Correspondence with authors (Oct. 1 2011).
251. Seminar participant (Mar. 10, 2011).
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of agendas being diverted, fear that equality might be one minor
value in wider human rights." 252 In Northern Ireland in
particular, although there have been instances where a single
institution could have been more effective-in reporting with
one voice to international human rights supervisory committees
for instance-the levers which the NIHRC has been given to
secure change are so different and limited relative to those of
the ECNI that bringing human rights and equality objectives
together within one set of working practices would in practice
be a major challenge. The fact that the current arrangements
are so closely linked to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement,
including its intergovernmental legal and political dynamics,
also raises the prospect of further provoking political tensions if
merger were to be pursued. This would not prevent, however,
discussions in Northern Ireland about how practical co-
operation could be enhanced and unhelpful "institutional
rivalry" avoided.
3. Community Relations
When commissions also had a remit covering community
relations, it had not been at the forefront of their work, and in
relation to the EHRC, the question whether it should lose that
responsibility is now on the agenda. It was argued that a human
rights remit provides a framework for resolving conflicts of
rights and good relations are the context in which an equality
and human rights agenda could be furthered. In the context of
the current backlash against multiculturalism and against
migrants, it could be counter-productive to disempower
commissions engaging in that debate. On the other hand, a
broad mandate could dissipate focus and resources, reducing
the impact of the body overall.
In Northern Ireland, the experience had been that the
responsibility of public bodies to promote good relations had
been used explicitly to undermine their responsibility to
promote equality. The question was whether having an Equality
Commission responsible for oversight of both dimensions
(notwithstanding the existence of a separate Community
Relations Council) was then important in enabling that tension
252. Id.
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to be resolved. If the commissions lost the good relations remit,
in which the relevance to the whole community is perhaps most
evident, is there a greater danger that their work would be seen
to be a minority concern? A distinction should perhaps be
drawn between having a broad remit, which is enabling, and
having capacity nevertheless to develop a focused agenda-a
difference between what you can do and must do.
More broadly among the commissions' differing roles it was
argued that there is considerable scope to reassess priorities. For
instance, is it a good use of staff time to be engaged for long
periods in writing statutory codes of practice on the equality
legislation, or should that be a government responsibility? In
each jurisdiction, with the exception of Scotland, there had
been limited engagement by the legislature in the way in which
the commissions had interpreted their remit. For example, the
Joint Committee on Human Rights ("JCHR") in the UK
Parliament had been a strong advocate of a single human rights
and equality commission, but had then been only intermittently
engaged in receiving reports on its work. 25, There was no
consistent reporting or scrutiny relationship that would have
facilitated that engagement.
Across the EU there is no singular pattern of remits or roles
regarding the equality bodies-a minority of which, seven out of
the thirty-seven members of the umbrella network Equinet, have
a broader human rights remit-nor expansive debates on what
those roles should be.254 Statutory bodies fulfill their legal duties,
often revolving around handling complaints of discrimination
rather than being expected to make a broader contribution.
Equinet is currently considering the pros and cons of bringing
equality and human rights together within one body. One
perceived barrier in the breadth of remit that would ensue is
that equality bodies rarely address matters of criminal law, but a
human rights body needs to do so.
253. On (he work of (he J(HR see: JOINT (OMM. ON HUM. RTS., EQu.A-Li & Hum.
RTS. (OMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10, 2009-10, H... 72, 11 82, 84
(U.K) (reporting that the J CHR is highly critical of the Commission. for example, on
the role of the chair, its progress in advancing human rights, and how the board
functioned). See generall JOINT COMM. ON HUM. Ris., HUM. RTS. IN THE U 1I, 201 1-12,
HC 1718- (U.K.) (presenting an oral evidence session with the chairs of the EHRC,
SHRC, NIHR(, and ECNI).
254. See EQUINET, supra note 50, at 5.
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C. Duties and Powers
The core question addressed here was whether the
differing statutory duties and powers of the bodies have been a
significant factor in their interpretation of their role and what
they have achieved. Are there particular duties and powers that
a commission has that in practice proved significant in
enabling it to deliver? Or conversely, are there instances where
the lack of a power has inhibited action which it might
otherwise have taken? Might there be instances where
enforcement powers have proved a barrier to working with
external bodies, or where partnership could have delivered
broader outcomes-whether deterring the body itself or others
such as business with whom it might want to work?
Four themes emerged from our research.
1. Significance of Powers
First, it was apparent that the powers of a commission were
not determinative of the influence that it could have. Powers
could be essential in some circumstances-for instance in
securing entry to a closed facility or in being able to conduct a
formal investigation. A body lacking a full tool kit of powers-
like the SHRC in its lack of power to take cases-is inhibited and
the opportunities for profile-raising they provide are thwarted. It
could nevertheless bring about change in other respects
through working in partnership with the bodies that needed to
change their practices, where there is a willingness to change.
"Impact is more than just a matter of legal powers," we were
told. "[M ] ost of an agenda moving forward is winning hearts
and minds rather than taking people to court." Use of powers
can raise levels of resistance, and powers in relation to handling
individual complaints can swamp a body with few resources,
limiting its capacity for strategic action. A body with fewer
powers has to use its limited powers more effectively and may be
much clearer about what it can and cannot achieve. If it cannot
rely on enforcement, it must rely on promotion, inquiries, and
partnership working.
On the other hand, where there is significant resistance to
change little might be achieved without powers to require
action. As one participant put it, "While the extent of statutory
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powers does not determine effectiveness, in a politically hostile
environment they can be critical." It is possible to cite instances
where litigation has forced changes in practice that would not
otherwise have happened. Resistance has historically been the
experience in many respects in Northern Ireland. Yet it is
notable that the challenges faced by the NIHRC have only
marginally related to its powers-for example, that its Bill of
Rights advice exceeded the remit provided. Leaving aside some
restrictions it has faced in the scope of its investigative powers, it
is judged to have the powers that it needs-but not the
resources, and at times in its history the staff expertise to use
them. The SHRC also has some restrictions on its investigation
powers, yet it may be its lack of resources to conduct an inquiry
that is the principal deterrent. A broad range of powers could
create unrealistic expectations which in practice, given resource
constraints, could not be met.
The impact of a formal investigation into the Crown
Prosecution Service ("CPS") in Britain by the former
Commission for Racial Equality was cited as an example where
the use of investigation powers could drive change. The CPS was
required to report every six months for a period after the
investigation into racially segregated workplaces in one of its
offices so that reform became a mainstream management
commitment that was transformative in its effect. 255Yet these
investigatory powers have in practice been used rarely by
commissions, in part because of the cost and time they consume;
in some cases a lack of relevant expertise; an ever-present fear of
challenge in the courts; and because they can produce a climate
in which people are defensive rather than cooperative, even
where they recognize the need for change. It was necessary for
each body to consider what could be achieved through taking
cases and conducting formal investigations and other
enforcement activity relative to other levers for change: "the test
of a power is how fiar it is a catalyst for change." The optimal
position, as one participant put it, is for a commission to have a
range of powers that provide flexibility in achieving its
objectives:"Having a range of powers does not mean that they all
255. See Addressing Equality and Diversity in the Crown Prosecution Seivice, PS
EQUALITY AND DtVLRStIY UNIT (Sept. 2004), available at hittp:// Nw.cps.gov.uk/
puiblication.s/docs/edu _stocktake.pdf
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have to be used. Commissions need to be strategic with them
and manage expectations where certain powers are not being
used." Commissions require a cogent theory of change, with
clarity on what could be achieved using different approaches but
this was not always evident in practice in the way the
commissions worked. It was also necessary to communicate to
the public how and why a power was being used. The power to
comment on the legislative process, used comprehensively by
the IHRC for instance, had not been highly effective in securing
change, despite the quality of the analysis.
2. Gap Between Responsibilities and Powers
The second theme was that the differing regulatory
frameworks related to equality and to human rights, and the
"distinctly more limited" powers in respect of the latter, create
an imbalance in the impact that a commission could have.
There could in this and other respects be a gap between a
commission's responsibilities and its powers; this was equally
true in Ireland's Equality Authority, for example, between its
distinct powers in relation to discrimination, but lack of powers
on the promotion of equality. Constraints on powers in tackling
discrimination could also limit effectiveness, for instance in
restrictions relating to discrimination by the state in the exercise
of its functions. In the United Kingdom, the Hampton
Principles on regulation require that a commission use the least
intrusive approach to achieve its objective. Yet that could
present practical difficulties; the time-scale in which a judicial
review could be launched meant that it could not be left as the
action of last resort. In that sense, the Hampton regulatory
principles might not be entirely appropriate for statutory bodies
in this field.
In a European context, the UK and Irish bodies were
nevertheless distinct in having broader duties and powers than
most of their counterparts, many of which are quasi-judicial
bodies focusing on cases, providing a more limited means for
securing publicity for issues or driving changes in practice.
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3. International Responsibilities
Third, the significance of the powers relating to the
international context should not be entirely overlooked;
responsibilities relating to the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities ("CRPD"), was given as one example.
Article 33(2) of that Convention requires governments to
establish a framework to "promote, protect and monitor
implementation," a responsibility variously given to some of the
commissions within our consideration, requiring that they must
ensure that civil society representatives-in particular people
with disabilities-are able to participate fully in that process.25
The Scottish HRC, together with the EHRC, had thus, for
instance, used web-casting to engage some 300 people across
Scotland prior to preparing their National Action Plan.
Designation as the responsible body under Article 33(2) of the
Convention thus brings responsibilities domestically and to
engage at the international level, in turn creating opportunities
to use the Convention as a lever for change-a position evident
also in the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against
Torture and the development of national preventative
mechanisms. It can nevertheless create unrealistic expectations
which must be managed, and the erroneous presumption that
the commission is the body responsible for implementation
itself. Fulfilling these new responsibilities under the CRPD was
complicated by the fact that in some cases responsibility had
been given to more than one body; no less than four designated
bodies in the UK and no new resources were in that case made
available to fulfill that role.
4. Transparency
Finally, the impact that a commission could have in
fulfilling its responsibilities was crucially affected by the extent
to which transparency was a requirement on those bodies it
regulated. If organizations were not required to make public
information on their employment and service provision, it was
difficult for a commission to be strategic in taking action against
the poorest performers, or those most failing to protect the
256. Convention on (he Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 33(2), Dec. 13,
2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
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human rights of vulnerable people. A duty on institutions to
make public such information in a timely manner would
significantly increase the capacity of the commissions to make
effective interv entions.
D. Independence and Accountability
A core issue that emerges in the literature, confirmed in
our consultation, is a tension between a commission's
operational autonomy and its accountability for use of its powers
and public money. We explored the question "independent
from whom?"-not only from government, but also from
civil society-and likewise "accountability to whom?" looking
in particular at the potential role of parliament relative to a
government department. The literature had suggested value
in teasing out differing modes of accountability, for financial
propriety, separately from use of legal powers or
engagement with civil society, and we explored the grounds
on which one might judge an optimal balance in such
arrangements in the context of the independence that the
Paris Principles require.
In the research project, three themes emerged.
1. Tension Between Independence and Accountability
First, there was a debate on what is meant by independence
and by accountability and on what was deemed the "irreducible
tension" between them. 257 The Paris Principles provided
inadequate guidance on this, so that a commission could have
"A" status at the UN but lack the substance of compliance on
either independence or accountability, even if the mechanisms
existed on paper. The need for differing forms of independence
and accountability, and the detail of how they should operate
effectively, had not been sufficiently considered when the
commissions were established-in the case of the EHRC despite
extensive debates within the Taskforce and subsequent Steering
Group that preceded it. There are nevertheless nuances in such
relationships for which it is difficult to make provision in
legislation; a fine line, for example, between a regulatory body
257. Seminar participant (Mar. 10, 2011) 
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that appropriately advises on the course of action government
should take and one that actively campaigns against the
government's position. Relationships also depend on
personalities, which legislation cannot regulate, but which
independence and accountability mechanisms need to be
sufficiently robust to address.
A lack of consensus on appropriate boundaries meant that
what felt to a sponsoring department like appropriate scrutiny
could be experienced as inappropriate interference by a
commission. While there was concern that there were instances
where governments had overstepped their role on substantive
issues and through micro-managing the operation of day to day
matters, it was also the case that commissions had not always
shown due regard to the need for accountability. The
unwillingness in 2010 of the IHRC to make the minutes of its
meetings since 2007 public was cited as one instance, and the
Public Accounts Committee's need to take the EHRC to task for
its failure to manage its finances appropriately was cited as
another instancei 5 Participants emphasized the pivotal role of
good governance in relation to a commission's relationship with
government, citing experience in Northern Ireland as well as in
other parts of the United Kingdom:
It is fundamental that independent organizations take
financial and governance accountability very seriously, as if you
are completely clean on all aspects of governance and seek
efficiencies all the time without prompting, then it is totally
possible to push at the policy boundaries with confidence and
rigor-a government that wants to rein you in will first and
foremost look for weaknesses in governance2 59
A lack of consensus on appropriate boundaries lay behind
some of the tensions that had arisen between commissions and
governments, including proposals to change the EHRC's
accountability framework. Section 3 of the 2006 Equality Act
stated that the EHRC should be subject to as little interference
as possible, but controversy over the handling of its finances had
weakened its authority in resisting reform. The fact that the
258. The accounts of the EHR( tor 2006 to 2008 were qualified by the Auditor.
259. Correspondence with the authors (Oct. 24, 2011).
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commission is accountable to government rather than to
Parliament, and hence that a Minister has to answer to
Parliament for a commission's performance, creates an
incentive in govermnent to micro-manage that is not present
where that accountability is direct to Parliament, as is the case in
Scotland.
A grey area is the appropriate day-to-day operating
relationship of the staff of a commission with government
officials, keeping in mind that neither commissions nor
government departments are monolithic entities. For a
commission to operate effectively, it was essential that its staff be
able to engage on a regular basis with officials responsible for
policy and practice relevant to equality and human rights,
without the independence of the commission being
compromised or its positions undermined or thought to be
compromised or undermined by that relationship. When that
relationship broke down, the capacity of the commission to
inform policy developments was weakened. At a European level
there was a greater span of experience and expectations on this
relationship, with an Equinet survey in 2007 finding that some
commissions see themselves as part of government and staffed
by civil servants. 260 In Ireland the chief executives of both
commissions at the time of writing were former civil servants;
this means that they were well placed to know how to secure
changes in government policy. 1 Former civil servants could
nevertheless-in theory if not in practice-feel constrained by
the unwritten rules on how civil servants should behave towards
the government of the day when, for example, they are on
secondment from their department. There is then the
connected matter of how commissioners perceive the staff of the
body and their implementation of existing policy and practice.
There is an inherent tension in the relationship between a
regulatory body and the government where the body has a
responsibility to challenge government decisions in court if
260. See Yesilkagit & Sniders, p ra note 45, (reporting on the survey in a study
commissioned by Equinet).
261. See IR. COUNCIL FOR CVIL LIBLRTILS, supra note 253, at 4 (noting that the
former Chief Executive of the IHRC (Eamonn MacAodha) was -seconded from a
Government iDepartment. to which the IHRC was obliged to refund the cost of his
salar" ). He was, in February 2012, appointed by the Irish Governincit as the new
ambassador to Belgium.
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necessary. The sponsoring department needed itself to be held
accountable for the way in which it managed that relationship,
but who would call the department to account when the
relationship between its staff and the commission breaks down,
or when custom and practice emerges that provides unhelpful
levels of constraint?
2. Relationship to Legislature
An alternative option is that a commission's primary
relationship of accountability is not to a government
department but to the legislature. The strong relationship of the
SHRC to the Scottish Parliament was contrasted to the limited
engagement there has been for the commissions in other
jurisdictions with their respective Parliaments or Assemblies.
There were thought to be clear advantages in regular dialogue
with, and being called to report to, a parliamentary committee.
This was an appropriate means to assess a commission's
priorities and question effectiveness in delivery, but also a
necessary counterweight to the influence of government which
could be overbearing. However, it was also suggested that having
direct access to a Minister potentially offers much needed
practical leverage and status.
In Scotland, it is significant that the SHRC's reporting
mechanism for its annual report, strategic plan, and finances is
to a non-political administrative board-the Parliamentary
Corporate Body-quite separate from any advocacy the
commission might undertake with other committees on
legislative matters. Its accountability to parliament is seen to
leave it free to scrutinize the actions of the Scottish government
without fear that this could have ramifications for its own
operation.
In Northern Ireland, a relationship between the NIHRC
and the Assembly could balance the direct relationship of
accountability to the Westminster government. An Assembly
committee could more appropriately have questioned the
NIHRC's priorities and decisions than, as happened in practice,
Members of the Assembly "shouting at it" from the side lines. In
Britain, the lack of a regular relationship with the JCHR had
perhaps contributed to the force with which it criticized the
commission when it did inquire into the performance of the
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EHRC on human rights in 2010, in the context of a series of
resignations by commissioners, 26 Increased accountability to
democratically elected representatives could increase the
legitimacy of commissions in the eyes of those representatives
and of the public. The solution may be that a commission
should not be exclusively accountable either to government or to
Parliament, but that there should be different forms of
accountability, not just one, and not just to the one that pays the
bill. Regarding the infrastructure of accountability to
government, a further complication arises from the
commissions' multiple mandates where those mandates do not
all fall within the remit of a single government department. In
Britain, the Government Equality Office in the Home Office is
the sole sponsoring department, marginalizing the role of the
Ministry of Justice despite its responsibility for human rights,
and indeed those departments responsible for core issues such
as race and disability. Human Rights Ministers are thus not
central to debates on the reform of the commission or in calling
it to account, despite its significance to delivery in their own
role.
In the final analysis, independence and accountability are
nevertheless a state of mind as well as a set of rules. A legal
framework for relationships could not determine definitively
how those relationships would play out. Personalities would play
a part in outcomes, and the way in which those relationships
were managed by the leaders of the respective organizations was
a significant factor in the balance of independence and
accountability that evolved over time.
3. Relationship to Civil Society
The relationship between the commissions and civil society
was a further tension; a statutory body should work with civil
society but not be captured by it, nor should civil society
organizations be so close to the commission that they could not
act as a constructive critic. Where the relationship between a
commission and its sponsoring department was poor, it was
noted that civil society organizations could be disempowered
262. See THL 2010 JCHR RLPORT, lhip:'//sV.publications.parliaientiuk/pa/
jt 2 00910/ tselect ijtrights/72/72.pdf.
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and unable to challenge the commission on its performance for
fear of giving weight to government criticisms that might weaken
it further.
There had at times been some ambiguity in whether a
commission spoke for a disadvantaged community, representing
its interests-the perception during periods in the history of the
CRE, for example, in relation to minority ethnic communities.
That was not appropriate for a statutory body, required to act in
the public interest, but it raised the question of what a
commission's relationship should be with the people whose
rights it exists to protect. If a commission saw a close
relationship with people with disabilities as compromising its
independence, for instance, that could damage confidence in
the body. However, there was a tangible difference between a
regulatory body operating in isolation from civil society on the
one hand, and a body that identified too closely with civil society
voices on the other; a commission needed to find an
appropriate balance between these poles. A commission could
also lose credibility with civil society groups if it raised
expectations, mobilizing them to support a policy reform, and
then failed to deliver-or if it consulted widely on its priorities
but then failed to be clear on the priorities or strategy it had
decided to pursue.
A commission's relationship with civil society is not limited
to those groups whose rights need to be protected. Civil society
groups can also be employers and service providers and hence
subject to the commission's powers in the same way as
organizations in the private and public sectors. Less attention
appears to have been given by commissions or in academic
analysis to optimal ways to manage this relationship, and with a
broader range of stakeholders, at a structural level. The EHRC
in Scotland and in Wales has a statutory advisory committee in
addition to commissioners, including members with local
authority, health sector, and NGO backgrounds. That structure,
in providing direct connections to stakeholders in addition to
the expertise brought in by commissioners, is said to anchor the
body and its priorities more closely with the organizations with
whom it needs effective relationships, a model not replicated in
the structure of the other commissions.
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E. Internal Governance, Structure, Staffing, and Budget
The Paris Principles require pluralism in the make-up of
the body, but this can take many forms. We considered whether
the executive Commission model is optimal or whether
alternatives such as Ombudsmen or a single Commissioner with
an advisory board should be considered. We explored whether
there are particular issues arising from the full- or part-time
role of the Chair relative to the role of the chief executive and
whether this relationship has been a central or marginal
factor in difficulties in the management of the bodies that have
arisen. A significant question was the extent to which the
commissions' very different budgets per capita have been a
factor in the priorities and pelformance of the bodies and
whether the severe budget cuts recently experienced were likely
to prove a major constraint.
First, it was clear that while commissions might have a
similar structure-a part time chair and non executive board,
for instance, they could work in very different ways-hence
structure does not determine outcomes. The former CRE and
EOC were cited as examples. One factor in that case was a high
turnover of chief executives in one case and not in the other.
The way commissioners were treated by the organization and
empowered (or not) to make an effective contribution was a
further factor. A commission had some autonomy in how it
organized its staff and in the extent to which it operated
through committees engaging commissioners and external
expertise, all of which could be factors in its effective operation.
The "software" of the organization was largely not set down by
statute but a matter for the chair and the commissioners
themselves. As one consultee put it: "[W]ith a half-decent
infrastructure, the right people with vision and strategic
approach, most structures can deliver.'20 The role of non-
executive commissioners was a significant point of contention.
Commissioners do not always feel that they have much control
over the way the organization runs, while staff can feel that this
is where control lies. In some cases it was suggested that the
boundary between commissioner and staff responsibility was
insufficiently clear, with commissioners overruling work that
263. Interview (June 1, 2011) 
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staff had already undertaken, and the chair-as well as the
CEO-involved in operational decisions. In another case it was
suggested that commissioners saw their role as holding the chair
and staff to account rather than that they are themselves the
commission and share collective responsibility for its work.
Combining the role of chair and CEO, as had happened for
periods in the life of more than one of the former commissions,
could blur the chair's strategic and operational or line
management roles; but the SHRC demonstrated that it could be
a workable model in a small commission. A chair who engaged
too directly in operational matters despite the existence of a
CEO could make it difficult for staff to know whom to approach
for a decision and for commissioners to know whom to call to
account. Where staff could by-pass the CEO to get a decision
from the chair, the CEO's authority could be severely
undermined, to the detriment of the effective management of
the commissionIs work. Commissioners could also effectively get
drawn into executive roles where staff, or their line managers,
lacked expertise on a particular issue or through
Commissioners' own motivation to play that role.
The commissioner model meant that high-level expertise
was available as a resource to the commission. Nevertheless,
there was some attraction in a single Commissioner and
Ombudsman model in which the responsibility for decisions was
thought to be clearer. In practice, it would seem that any of
these models can work, depending on who is appointed to fill
the positions, and the skill of the chair in leading the team. If
commissioners do not gel as a group, much time and energy can
be dissipated in resolving disagreements, including staff time in
provision of the papers on which such discussions can focus.
Chair and commissioners did not always have a full
understanding of appropriate governance arrangements, for
instance on financial matters, creating challenges for a CEO
responsible as Accounting Officer for the proper handling of
public funds. There had been a tendency in some of the human
rights (as opposed to equality) commissions to appoint
commissioners who were almost entirely people with expertise
on human rights issues, albeit often with sharply differing views,
rather than including some people for their political skills or
expertise valuable in the operation of the commission such as
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY
governance, finance, or communication skills. In one instance
where commissioners were predominantly people with great
expertise on the issues addressed by the commission, we were
told: "There were bitter differences between people, all experts,
convinced they were right, quite unaware that the public were
not relating to the debates in the terms they were having
them. "264
At a later stage in that commission's life, a greater breadth
of commissioners had been appointed, but the result was that
some were not able to engage in debates on human rights issues
as they were insufficiently knowledgeable; "you need people
with human rights expertise and political skills. 4'26 5 The tendency
in Northern Ireland to interpret the statutory requirement that
commissioners are "as a group . . . representative of the
community" to include political appointees from across the
community divide had exacerbated the challenge of securing
consensus.
The ability of the chair to articulate a vision that brought
commissioners and staff together, to engender respect and trust
among the board, and to carry authority externally and to fulfill
the role without impinging on the role of the chief executive
were seen as of the utmost importance for which no statutory
mandate nor budget could compensate. The chair needed to be
able to convey that vision to people with no expertise on human
rights or equality, but needed the expertise to carmy authority
when questioned or in presenting to expert audiences. As one of
those we consulted recounted:
When [one chair] spoke on a public platform, s/he was veiy
impressive but you could see that s/he was talking above
people's heads. When [a subsequent chair] spoke, when
first appointed, s/he said things about human rights that
were simply not accurate - but s/he had huge appeal. You
need both.26t
In the staffing and committee structure, there was a tension
between mainstreaming equality and human rights issues across
the body, or separating them out to ensure a focus that accords
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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some priority to an issue-a separate disability committee for
instance or staff unit exclusively addressing that issue.
A further theme was structure relative to the geography of
the country-whether a regional presence was needed to ensure
impact in parts of the country facing particular issues or in
remote places. An organization based in London or even in
Glasgow, it was said, cannot know what is happening in the
Western Isles. A commission needs some mechanism for making
that connection, as resources will often preclude a significant
regional presence.
One further issue that we did not have scope to explore was
the remuneration of chair and commissioners which may be a
factor, among other considerations, in public perceptions of a
commission and the value for money it represents.
Resources were essential to carry out some functions, hence
the size of the budget was undoubtedly important. Where a
commission has statutory functions that procedurally are
resource intensive, not least those of ECNI in relation to
monitoring compliance of each public body with their Section
75 responsibilities for instance, staffing (and hence budget) has
to reflect those roles (see Appendix). In relation to other
responsibilities, a tight budget can encourage partnership
working which in some respects could bring results. There is,
thus, no precise correlation between budget and outcomes. It
was also a matter of how a commission chose to spend its
budget; the Irish Council for Civil Liberties ("ICCL") had a
similar budget to the IHRC, but whereas ICCL had a significant
programme budget, the Commission had used its resources
largely for staff. Some commissions were more effective than
others in using the media to build a positive public profile, a
matter of skill more than resources once a certain threshold of
staff capacity has been passed. As one participant argued:
"Whilst additional resources can certainly increase the potential
for impact, big is not always beautiful here and the profile of the
Commission, the capacity it has (including crucially the staff
profiles) is more important than the budget."267
A large budget could reflect a role as a serv ice provider,
handler of complaints, or, in the case of the ECNI, a monitoring
267. Interv iew (July 26, 2011)
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY
role in relation to equality schemes, rather than simply an
advocacy organization. Budget cuts could in part be addressed
through reassessment of strategy and priorities. Nevertheless,
loss of staff could seriously damage the morale and capacity of
an organization and negatively impact the skills available to it.
Finally, the expertise of staff was cited as a crucial factor in
effectiveness, and ensuring the commission was respected by
those it sought to influence. Staff also needed political
judgment, in relation to people in power and in assessing the
most effective means to build public support. With hindsight,
one former staff member of a commission thought that part of
the difficulty it had faced was a lack of that judgment: "We were
motivated by what was right and wrong, not by what was strategic
and politically clever. We needed to discuss the political
implications of what we wanted to do, but we didn't. The mantra
was that human rights are unpopular, but we must act
anyway.'" 26 There was also self-criticism, with hindsight, of the
way in which the work of another commission had been
conveyed to those whose support they needed:
We didn't make the work relevant to politicians or those
they were there to serve. It was legalistic, formulaic-an
intellectual approach not about the impact on the
vulnerability of the individual. It was always missing
emotional intelligence, the human element. As a result the
public would not detend [the Commission] if politicians
suggested abolishing it . . . . Lawyers were paramount.
Their view of the world held. The biggest gap was
engagement at the political leveli 69
The Chief Executive's judgment in this respect, and
capacity to manage staff and resources effectively, is seen as
pivotal to the effectiveness of the commission in all cases.
Fulfilling that role within a commission accountable to a chair
and non executive board, in a politically sensitive high-profile
field, can require different skills from the equivalent role in
another setting, and not all CEOs have adapted well to that role.
268. Inteview (June 1, 2011)
269. Interview (Oct. 24, 2011)
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Ni'. MEASURING OUTCOMES AND EFFECTVEAESS
In assessing the impact of differing factors on the
performance of commissions, we have consciously not addressed
a key underlying question of how the commissions have actually
perlormed. Were we to do so, the question arises by what criteria
should we judge the impact of these bodies and with what
indexes could that impact be measured? Who, moreover,
should conduct evaluations? And if such evaluations have not
been conducted, are there nevertheless criteria we can use now
to compare impact, or is such an exercise not valid given the
very different political contexts in which the bodies are working
and remits they have been given?
Some of the commissions were giving increasing attention
to evaluation of their own interventions. There was agreement
amongst those consulted that there was no simple way to capture
the effectiveness of the body given the many other factors
influencing equality and human rights outcomes. Process
measures are the most straightforward: had the commission
done, for instance, what it said in its business plan? The EHRC
Triennial Review reports, monitoring equality and human rights
outcomes, was an invaluable aid to assessing progress in those
agendas, but not of the performance of the Commission itself or
of the impact of equality and human rights law. A survey of
stakeholders to assess satisfaction with the commission's
performance would be one measure, meaningful over time, but
limited not least because stakeholders would themselves have
only partial knowledge of what the body had achieved. This
difficulty in assessing impact was no different from that faced by
many other bodies. The JCHR for instance was currently
engaged in tackling the same question. For that body, one
measure was the extent to which government had implemented
each of its recommendations over the life of one Parliament, but
even that question posed methodological challenges. It was even
more difficult to assess whether the committee had improved
the quality of debates on human rights in Parliament and raised
the level of human rights literacy.
A commission needed to conduct its own regular
assessment of its impact in addition to external scrutiny. An
annual report could be presented to Parliament or legislative
assembly where the basis of that assessment could appropriately
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be challenged. The SHRC was aware of the need to report
substantively to Parliament after its first three years to secure
support for future funding. Parliamentary scrutiny serves the
secondary role of raising the profile of the issues concerned.
Nevertheless, Commissions should avoid the danger of adopting
a series of short-term targets that then become the drivers
distorting priorities towards what is measurable.
Comparing the effectiveness of commissions presented a
near insurmountable challenge given their different remits.
Partial measures could be used such as measuring name
recognition, as it cannot be fully effective if the public does not
know that it exists. There would be less agreement on using a
measure of how often the body uses its powers, as that could
equally be judged an indicator of failure to succeed through
persuasion-or how many cases are brought to its helpline, as
that could indicate a rising problem rather than any greater
confidence that the body will be able to address it.
CONCL USION
The controversy that frequently surrounds each of the six
commissions within our focus-with the possible exception of
the SHRC, still in its early years-raises the question that this
article has sought to address: what are the factors that influence
performance and which of them are within the control of the
commission itself? An understanding of these factors is
fundamental to any debates on reform or merger of these
bodies and to any wider discussion on European and
international guidance on NHRIs and statutory equality bodies.
Our research suggests the following tentative conclusions.
First, that the domestic and international context in which the
commissions were established had necessarily been highly
significant in determining their remit, powers, and institutional
form, and that context had continued to be formative in their
operation. Mergers of former bodies had proved a challenging
start, particularly if the precursor bodies had little experience of
working together, had differing internal cultures, if merger had
resulted in a mismatch of staff skills with the new commission's
remit, or if the merger was not well managed. European and
international human rights standards, as an operating context,
provided a valuable yardstick and legitimacy, albeit more
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powerful in some domestic political contexts than in others.
Domestic political settings had proved more conducive for some
commissions than others, had set expectations to which
commissions had to respond, and influenced priorities and
internal structures. Opposition, where it led to repeated
challenge, could have a chilling effect and absorb
disproportionate staff resources. Commissions tread a fine line
when deciding when to challenge and when to hold back;
repeated challenge may weaken public or political support, but
failure to challenge may undermine confidence in the
commission and the morale of its staff and supporters. In most
cases the economic climate had recently contributed to budget
cuts, without evident public concern. Notwithstanding the
significance of these external factors, they need not be
determinant of performance. Some aspects of the environment
were open to influence by the commission, including public
expectations and support, and a commission with a clear vision,
strategic leadership, a little courage, and appropriate skill sets
could make an impact despite the constraints. Commissions may
need to refresh their message in order to build public support,
adopting broader arguments and addressing the concerns of
skeptics, rather than assuming that clearer communication of an
existing message will prove persuasive.
The experience of the commissions provided evidence for
and against the case for a broad remit. A broad remit, in
particular embracing human rights and equality, but also arising
in these islands in relation to children, age equality, and
community relations, could enable a commission to address
related issues effectively and to resolve tensions (e.g. between
competing equality rights or between equality and good
relations). Fragmentation into separate institutions, whether a
result of devolution (in the United Kingdom) or separate
development, created a level of complexity and confusion for
individuals seeking assistance, that can be avoided within a
single institution. However, that could bring disadvantages if
there were tensions arising from differing remits or a dissipation
of focus and resources. Equality, human rights, and community
relations approaches differ and may not easily be reconciled in
practice. However defined, a statutory remit nevertheless left
some scope for differing interpretation of roles, priorities, and
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working relationships with statutory partners so that the remit
itself could not be deemed solely responsible for impact.
In this discussion on remit, the current focus on the "core
regulatory responsibilities" of the EHRC raised the question of
how narrowly or broadly a regulatory body might define its
role-whether narrowly on enforcement or more broadly to
embrace promotion of awareness and good practice. If narrowly
defined, "regulatory body" might not be appropriate
terminology for an NHRI for which raising awareness and
understanding of human rights is a primary function.
In relation to the powers of a commission, we saw some
common themes emerge. First, it was apparent that the powers
of a commission were not determinative of the influence that it
could have. Powers were essential in some circumstances, and
where lacking a commission is undoubtedly inhibited in the
action it can take. It could nevertheless bring about change in
other respects through guidance or working in partnership
where there is a willingness to change. A full suite of powers can
raise expectations that a commission, lacking resources or facing
other obstacles to use of those powers, may be unable to fulfill.
Commissions need to have a cogent theory of change with
clarity on what could be achieved using different approaches,
but this was not always evident in practice. It was also necessary
to communicate to the public how and why a power was being
used. The impact that a commission could have in fulfilling its
responsibilities was also affected by the extent to which those
whom it was regulating were required to be transparent about
their operation. A duty on institutions to make public such
information in a timely manner would significantly increase the
capacity of the commissions to make effective interventions.
Turning to the "irreducible tension" between
independence and accountability, there has historically been
insufficient guidance on the complexity of these crucial
relationships in the Paris Principles. This has been remedied to
some extent by the practical work of the ICC, and guidance that
has emerged on equality bodies. Sufficient thought had
nevertheless not always been given to the architecture needed
prior to the commissions being established. A lack of consensus
on the appropriate boundaries of the commission-government
relationship, where there is a sponsoring department, had often
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been the source of tensions, but there were also instances where
governments had overstepped the line, and where commissions
had been insufficiently accountable for their actions. The
operation of the accountability mechanism could be distorted
where the commission's mandate stretched beyond the
sponsoring department. A commission s relationship with the
legislative body was an important counterweight to government
interference, but also an important means in its own right to
assess a commission's priorities and performance. There were
times when a parliamentary forum for regular dialogue might
have avoided the sharp criticism that members of the legislature
have individually voiced. The relationship with civil society is
also a matter of balance: sufficiently close to listen and give
account, not so close as to compromise independence or the
commission's stature as a statutory body. The statutory provision
for the EHRC in Scotland and Wales to have an advisory
committee made up of representatives from key sectors in
addition to commissioners had brought advantages unavailable
in that form to the other commissions. Notwithstanding the pros
and cons of different models, independence and accountability
are in part a state of mind for which the statute cannot legislate.
Responsibility for managing the relationship successfully falls to
the leaders of the commissions and to that of the scrutiny bodies
concerned.
In relation to governance and structure, it was evident that
commissions with similar arrangements could in practice work
in very differing ways; the "software" of an organization is not
prescribed by statute. A lack of clarity in respective roles of
commissioners and staff was one fault line identified, with part-
time commissioners not always having sufficient engagement
with the work of the commission to exercise their responsibility,
while at other times stepping beyond the non-executive role.
Their expertise could be invaluable; nevertheless, the model of a
single full-time commissioner merited consideration, although
the plurality rightly required by the Paris Principles would then
need to be assured in other ways. The breadth and depth of
expertise of the staff were identified as crucial to each
dimension of a commission's mandate-whether its authority in
promoting good practice or legal skill in litigation and
enforcement. Among commissioners and senior staff, expertise
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on human rights and equality issues also had to be
complemented by political judgment if the commission was to
use its powers and resources strategically in light of the
opportunities and constraints it faced. In that judgment and in
managing the staff and resources of the organization, the Chief
Executive's role was crucial. The leadership of the chair and
capacity to convey vision and authority was also a pre-requisite
for which no structure or resources could compensate if lacking.
That leadership was crucial to a commission's external
relationships, and to ensuring that the commission is strategic in
steering the most effective course of action, not simply reacting
to circumstances as they arise.
Significant resources are essential to carry out some of a
commission's functions, including formal investigations and
litigation. There is nevertheless no clear correlation between
budget and outcomes. In an encouraging climate, progress
could be made in some (but not all) respects through
partnership working. There is no simple way to measure the
effectiveness of commissions, albeit it is easier to measure
process than outcomes. There are partial measures that can be
identified. A commission needs to conduct regular assessments
of its own pertormance as well as to be subject to external
scrutiny.
In essence, it is evident that there is no single factor that
can account for the performance of a commission; it is not a
reflection of its remit, powers, structure, resources, staff, or
leadership alone. A commission operates within an environment
of constraints and opportunities, some of which the commission
has greater capacity to influence than others-the outcome of
its efforts thus dependent only in part on how well it marshals its
resources and manages its work. Nevertheless, the evidence
suggests that there remains significant scope for strong
leadership, sound management, political judgment, and staff
expertise to make a substantive difference in the performance of
the commissions so that they are a catalyst for change. The six
commissions examined in the United Kingdom and Ireland in
this research may take comfort from the fact that it is those
factors that are within their control.
2012] 1685
1686 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1615
20121 HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUALITY 1687
APPE DIX
A. Starling and annual budgets
Direct comparison of staffing levels and budgets is not
possible as the commissions have, as we have shown, vastly
differing statutory responsibilities, including some, as in the case
of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, that are
necessarily labor intensive. Given those differences, it would be
erroneous to suggest that each commission should have roughly
comparable staffing and budget levels. The authors therefore
include the table below only as a contribution to debate on
resources, including consideration of the basis on which
appropriate resource allocation should be made.
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